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Foreword 
Recent events in Europe have graphically illustrated the terrible plight of 
refugees, forced from home with what few belongings could be carried, and 
massed by the thousands in makeshift and inadequate camps. The Pacific Islands 
were once the scene of similar tragedy, when the Allied forces battled the empire 
of Japan during World War II. 
With the 7 December attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States became 
embroiled in a Pacific war that did not end until the Japanese surrender of 14 
August 1945. For the Japanese civilians living on Saipan, Mariana Islands, that 
date was difficult to accept, no less difficult than the circumstances of their 
internment as wards of the victorious American forces. They were the unwanted 
residue of an unwanted war. They were commanded in military fashion by men 
who had no taste for the task, and who, for want of Japanese language skills, 
could not express whatever sympathy they might have felt. 
To this scene, in the early weeks of 1945, came Norman Meller, a young 
naval officer who could at least speak the language of the internees and, he might 
hope, use his knowledge as an attorney to ameliorate their inexorable plight. 
How well he succeeded in overcoming innumerable hurdles is the subject of this 
work. That he accomplished as much as he did and kept a sense of humor is the 
wonder of it all. 
As Dr Meller explains, "International law clearly defined the minimum stan-
dards to be observed for captured military personnel, but no comparable norms 
of clarity were applicable to civilians." Of those, it will be noted, there were some 
18,000 squeezed into one small swampy area known as Camp Susupe. 
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Lacking well-defined guidelines, Dr Meller found himself cast in a tour de 
force wherein he alternated roles as labor arbiter, detective, dietitian, agricultur-
ist> economic advisor, and even impresario. (In the last role, he scrounged films 
to be shown at the camp. One of them featured Maestro Toscanini. The audience 
:;' .' . .. . 
thought they were watching Charlie Chaplin and were highly amused!) 
Dr Mell~ has been no stranger to Saipan since his wartime tour of duty. He 
has returned many times as consultant to the emerging island entities as they 
. '..' ~ .', 
planned the constitutional governments that have evolved. His. last visit, fifty 
years after the events described here, became the inspiration for this memoir. 
The literature of World War II in Micronesia consists largely of military 
. , . 
histories and.autobiographical accounts of US soldiers and sailors. Understand-
ably, the focus of most studies of the war has been strategy and battles. Com-
;!' -. . 
mander Dorothy Richard, whose narrative history of the naval administration in 
Micronesia is the most detailed study available, recounts the US military's 
attempts to regulate civilian life on Saipan, as thousands of individuals-Caro-
linians~ Chamorros, Koreans, Japanese, and Okinawans--crossed the American 
lines. Earlier, the US Navy had produced a pictorial history of Camp Susupe 
(1945), and in the slightly blurred black-and-white images of wartime devastation 
and the initial shanties a graphic tale emerges with an emotional impact far . 
• , . t 
" , 
beyond the statistics and logkeeping ofRichard'~ work. A more reflective piece 
on the administration of civilian camps on Saipan is found in John Embree's 1946 
article, "Military Government in Saipan and Tinian," which criticized both US 
attitudes and the confusion of bureaucratic ·structure. For the indigenous Cha-
morros and Carolinians ofSaipan, World War II was a historic landmark etched 
in memory through loss, sorrow, and eventual triumph. The recently produced 
history textbook for the high schools of the Northern Mariana~ contains consid-
erable detail on Camp Susupe, and through author Don Farrell's writing a new 
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generation of students will learn what their grandparents experienced and over-
came. Dr Meller's work offers a personal account of the trying times on Saipan, 
and gives both historians and the general reader background information with the 
immediacy of first-person narrative. 
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Preface 
In July 1995 I was invited to return to Saipan to participate in a seminar about 
Camp Susupe, fifty years after the end of World War II. So far as I know; none 
of the Japanese or Korean civilians who had been interned in Susupe was on the 
island and attended, so that the reminiscences of both participants and audience 
applied primarily to the experiences of the Chamorro and Carolinian residents of 
Saipan. Some of the remarks volunteered by younger members of the audience 
equated Camp Susupe with the infamous German concentration camps in 
Europe. On inquiry I found that they were premised on little knowledge other 
than that many hardships were suffered by the local Islanders during the war, and 
mainly reflected their great resentment over the fact that the United States Gov-
ernment did not permit them to live outside the confines of the camp until 4 July 
1946, long after the end of the war and by the time that both Japanese and Korean 
civilians had been repatriated. That is the Independence Day Saipan now cele-
brates each Fourth of July! Prodded by this experience, I determined to record 
my memories of Camp Susupe before history had been so reshaped-whether in 
the Marianas, Japan, Korea, or the United States-as to bear only faint resem-
blance to what actually occurred over a half century ago on Saipan. I was there 
from the beginning of 1945 until December of that year. 
Almost every evening while on Saipan in 1945, I wrote a letter to my wife in 
San Francisco, sharing with her the unusual events ofthe day. Unfortunately I 
cannot say that this present account of Camp Susupe is based on materials 
extracted from those letters, for they have long since been disposed of as part of 
the "garbage" of the war years, along with the photographs of sample Susupe 
food rations, and the Japanese samurai sword with which I returned-to which 
reference will be found in chapter 11. Nevertheless, many memories of my 
service in naval military government while on Saipan remain, some poignantly 
vivid, probably reinforced by once having been written down. Where memory 
IX 
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fails me as to specifics that are included in the text, reference to US Navy publi-
cations has helped to fill the lacunae. Also of assistance have been the very dis-
cerning observations of life in Camp Susupe over a two-week period in August 
1945, by Dr John F Embree while on a mission for the Office of War Information. 
Later, when we were both faculty members at the University ofHawai'i, they 
were discussed further with him. I have not hesitated to contradict published 
sources where I know from my own experience that their contents are in error; 
consequently any such failure of concurrence should be regarded as intended and 
not due to oversight on my part. 
x 
1920-1944 
Chronology of Events 
Northern Marianas, including Saipan, part of League of 
Nations mandate administered by Japan. 
7 December 1941 Pearl Harbor attacked by Japanese. United States entered 
war. 
8 December 1941 Japanese attacked Guam from bases on Saipan. 
10 December 1941 Americans on Guam surrendered to Japanese. 
31 January 1944 United States forces invaded Marshall Islands. 
11 June 1944 United States bombardment of Saipan (campo) began. 
15 June 1944 
7 July 1944 
9 July 1944 
1944-1962 
21 July 1944 
6 August 1945 
9 August 1945 
14 August 1945 
2 September 1945 
December 1945 
4 July 1946 
18 July 1947 
February 1975 
D day. United States forces invaded Saipan. 
Last banzai charge of Japanese military. 
Saipan secured. 
Saipan under administration of United States Navy. 
Guam invaded by United States forces. 
Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. 
Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. 
Japan surrendered. 
Surrender signed aboard USS Missouri. 
Japanese and Korean citizens repatriated. 
Chamorro and Carolinean civilians permitted to live outside 
Camp Susupe. 
Northern Marianas, including Saipan, became part of United 
Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered 
by United States. 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands created. 
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Peace \ 
Early in 1945, after a tour at Pearl Harbor translating captured Japanese 
documents, I was ordered to Camp Susupe, serving initially as interpreter for the 
commander of Area 3, the Japanese compound. It was one of three areas of the 
camp where civilians were interned by the military government. My naval training 
had not prepared me for military government service. Neither then, nor after I 
succeeded to command of the Japanese compound, was I ever introduced to the 
military government and civil affairs manuals and handbooks that were supposed 
to guide my actions. Perhaps such book knowledge was considered unessential, 
as military government was expected, as well as directed, to integrate with the 
military operations and to depart from the rules as necessary to fit local condi-
tions. As commander of the Japanese compound, by far the largest of the three 
civilian areas, the duties I assumed were mostly of a supervisory nature; I was to 
see that orders were observed, act as liaison between the naval military govern-
ment command and the internal Japanese administration it had set up in Susupe, 
and assure that camp life continued without untoward incident. 
Marine Corps civil affairs officers had landed on the Saipan beaches on 16 
June 1944, the second day of the invasion, and on the fourth had declared the 
establishment of military government on the island. The naval military govern-
ment contingent had followed close behind. Long before the assault phase was 
over and the marines had officially turned over civil affairs to the navy, the naval 
military government had assumed the herculean task of feeding, sheltering, and 
attending to the other basic needs of the nearly eighteen thousand civilians who 
survived the hellish cataclysm of small-island warfare. As a macabre footnote, 
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this task had been immeasurably lightened by the deaths of over one-third of the 
civilians on the island. Some had been killed in the campo (the air and sea bom-
bardment that began on Dday mirius 4), some in the fighting that followed, and 
others by the mass suicides of whole families as the position of the Japanese 
defending forces became ever more desperate. The survivors included some 
13,500 Japanese, 1,350 Koreans, 2,230 Chamorros, and 800 Carolinians. Of the . 
over 30,000 Japanese military on Saipan on D day, less than six ,percent survived. 
By the time 1 arrived on Saipan, the Japanese compound ofC~mp Susupe 
was well established and that initial period just a searing memory. The Korean 
laborers marooned on Saipan by the war were now accommodated in a sm~ll 
adjoining compound (Area.2). A mile or so away, the old sugar town of Char an 
Kanoa (Area 1) had been ~ehabilitated to accommodate the indigenous 
Chamorros and Carolinians who had been moved out of the original part of .. 
Camp Susupe (Area 3). The naval military government team had settled.into 
well .. established routines: overseeing the external farm where internees grew 
vegetables on their own plots to be cooked as part of the camp meals, running a 
school system to educate some eight thousand civilian ~hildren, facilitating the 
small-scale businesses established by civilians both inside the camp and on the . 
"Ginza" just outside the Japanese area fence, promoting the production of 
handicraft and its sale to the GIs on the island, and providing a range of services 
comparable to those of any small city. 
Saipan was now a major air and naval base, with its huge Kobler and Isley. 
Fields fully operational for long-range bombers. Daily, hundreds ofB-29s were 
taking off from the island, neighboring Tinian, and not-so-distant Guam, to drop 
their saturation loads of incendiary bombs on targets in Japan. Clearly, the engine 
roar of the airplanes leaving Saipan could be heard. in camp, just as the yellow 
lights under the cockpits of the returning planes with wounded airmen aboard 
2 
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could·be seen. Previously the Japanese compound had seethed with rumors about 
the Japanese navy shortly coming to liberate Saipan and to drive the Americans 
into the sea. When the vessels failed to materialize, these whispered stories meta-
morphosed.into imminent, surreptitious landings.from.Japanese.suhmarines bent 
on committing devastating sabotage. Indeed, an air raid launched from Okinawa 
and Iwo Jima had permitted Japanese planes to reach Saipan and bomb its air-
fields, but soon the taking of Iwo Jima by the American armed forces had 
foreclosed any repetition. 
Earlier, in February 1944, United States armed forces had landed,in the 
Marshall Islands, at the eastern boundary of Japan's League of Nations Micro-
nesian mandate. In March the Japanese evacuated between 3,000 and 5,000 
civilians, mostly women and children, from Saipan to Japan. Some 27,000 to 
30,000 civilians remained. While the Japanese authorities had incorrectly antici-
pated that the Palaus would be the next Micronesian invasion target, they were 
taking no chances. However, they could not have foreseen the inexorableness of 
the American military thrust, which would continue to carry the fighting ever 
closer to the Japanese homeland. News of how the tide of war had turned against 
the Japanese, and of the B-29s raiding Tokyo almost at will, reached Camp 
Susupe's internees intermittently through print, film, and (indirectly) broadcasts 
of the island military radio. Little, ifany, of this was in Japanese, and most had to 
be filtered through civilians with limited English-language abilities. Undoubtedly 
much of it was watered down and its import discounted. Nevertheless, morale 
within the Japanese compound, always poor due to camp living conditions, was 
further undermined. A majority of the internees were ofOkinawan ancestry, 
brought to Saipan from that island to labor in the sugar fields; with Okinawa 
under American control, it no longer promised to be a place of ultimate refuge 
should the war someday end in a stalemate. No wonder there could be 
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A shiksha in the Japanese compound. (John Embree) 
disagreement over what was actually occurring outside the confines of the 
isolated little world that was Camp Susupe. 
Fifty years later, it is difficult to recall all the details of the slumlike conditions 
under which the 13,500 Japanese civilians lived. Almost half of them were 
children under sixteen years of age. Row upon row of nondescript shik'sha 
(barracks), twenty feet wide and twice as long-166 of them in all-had been 
erected out of scrap lumber salvaged from the debris of war left after the 
American invasion forces pushed across the island. Each was separated from its 
neighbors by about its own width to reduce the danger of fire. Benjo (open-pit 
latrines) were interspersed throughout the compound. At least one hundred feet 
from the barracks, strategically placed shallow wells tapped the island's high 
water table to meet the internees' need for water for daily bathing and for laun-
dering their clothes. Corrugated iron salvaged from the town of Garapan and the 
old sugar mill, which before the war had been at the heart ofSaipan's economy, 
served both as roofing for the barracks and for shoulder-high shielding around 
the latrines. Many of the sheets still bore bullet and shrapnel holes. Rain falling on 
4 
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Ruins of the sugar mill at Charan Kanoa. (Norman Meller) 
the metal roofing was caught in used oil drums lined up under the eaves, and 
provided a welcome substitute for the highly chlorinated potable water supplied 
to the camp. Movable screens and temporary partitions erected by the internees 
compartmentalized the interiors of the low barracks in an attempt to provide a 
modicum of privacy to the 75 to 100 civilians who called each one home. 
Each day, long lines of Japanese civilians queued up before waiting trucks, all 
with labor tags of red cloth attached to their clothing and carrying personal iden-
tification cards. Most of the men were destined for the huge warehouses erected 
near the docks, to move the mountains of materiel continuously being landed and 
stockpiled on Saipan to carry the war ever closer to Japan. The women worked 
mainly at the army military laundry, to which the GIs on the island sent their dirty 
clothing and linens. 
Within the barbed-wire fence that surrounded the compound was a function-
5 
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ing small city, complete with its ownyakuba (civilian administration), suijiba 
(kitchens) providing cooked meals, several dispensaries tending to minor ills and 
serving as hospital intakes for the more serious cases, an orphanage for the care 
of youngsters whose parents had died and for whom no foster families could be 
found, and two ethnically distinct police forces. The internal Japanese police 
enforced observance of the camp rules; the Chamorro and Carolinian police 
guarded the periphery, challenging at the gates any internee seeking to leave and 
searching all those returning from work. Probably the largest single source of 
employment for the island's indigenous men was this police force. In patrolling 
the compound fence, they were nightly supplemented by a US Marine detach-
ment, nominally to stop the possible infiltration of Japanese military personnel 
still hiding in the island's central spine of hills, but also to interdict American GIs 
bent on seeking the female companionship they had so long forgone, even if with 
a civilian of the enemy. 
Abruptly all ofthis came to a halt one day in June, and I was faced with an 
unprecedented problem that somehow would have to be resolved. The captain in 
charge of the naval hospital on the side of the Japanese compound, and respon-
sible for maintaining its internees' health and the camp's sanitation, phoned to 
alert me. The civilian who drove the main garbage truck around the Japanese 
compound, emptying the trash cans and carting their contents off to the dump, 
had been arrested for causing a disturbance. Clearly implied was that, as Japanese 
area commander, I should somehow intervene so that essential garbage service 
would continue uninterrupted. As a lowly lieutenant, junior grade, who was I to 
demur? I left my office, which was close to the main gate, just outside the Japa-
nese compound, returned the salute of the Chamorro policeman guarding the 
gate, and walked through, headed for the Japanese police station a short distance 
away. 
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The Japanese police force at Camp Susupe. (US Navy) 
As I walked over to where the garbage truck driver was being held, I 
searched my memory for anything pertinent I could recall. He was big for a 
Japanese, heavy of body, and gross offace. The 55-gallon used oil drums, now 
fitted with wooden covers, that served as the camp's trash containers required a 
very strong man to lift and empty them when filled. His was a smelly and dis-
tasteful job, for which there were probably few applicants. The accented Japanese 
he spoke was a distant cry from the Tokyo dialect on which I had been trained in 
the naval language school, and beyond the exchange of minimal greetings, I had 
found it difficult to understand him. At best I may have spoken to him a half 
dozen times or so and was not particularly conscious of him when he was on his 
rounds. The general impression he left was of stolid ness, of being mentally slow, 
if not possibly a little retarded. 
When I reached the police station, I found the garbage truck driver blustering 
to the policeman at his side and to anyone else within hearing range that he had 
done nothing wrong, that it was the people of Camp Susupe who were respon-
sible-they had caused the disturbance. As things quieted down a little, in 
anticipation of the arrival of the public safety officer, I managed to talk to the 
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policeman. What had happened? Well, there had been a fight last night in the 
camp. The garbage truck driver had started distributing leaflets, people objected 
and tried to stop him, shouting came to shoves and then blows, and the police 
were called in to restore order. 
And the offending leaflet? It consisted of a single page and bore but one 
Japanese kanji T,' a character symbolizing peace. I was shown a sheet of paper 
that previously had been badly crumpled and was now only partly smoothed out. 
The calligraphy was boldly executed, with wide brush strokes stretching across 
the entire surface, and reproduced through some form oflithography. No accom-
panying text, no explanation, no signature. The single sheet, with the Japanese 
character roughly drawn and crudely reproduced across it, remains fixed in my 
mind's eye. Something unusual was occurring, with a disturbing potential that I 
could sense but not articulate. I never did learn all of the background to the 
affair, but of one thing I feel certain: somehow related to it was the murder that 
followed a month or so later, the only major crime that occurred in Camp Susupe 
during the near year I was on Saipan. 
I motioned to the garbage truck driver to sit down beside me in a chair in an 
empty corner of the room. "Tell me what happened. Did you pass out the hand-
bill? Why? Did you write it?" I cannot remember ifI asked whether anyone else 
was involved, but in any event it would have been unnecessary as his answers 
quickly resolved that matter. He himself had prepared the leaflet and personally 
handed it out. It was essential that there be. peace in camp, and he was merely 
calling for everyone to live together peacefully. Angrily, he denied causing the 
disturbance; he was just distributing the leaflet, and it was other people who tried 
to stop him. They had started the fight. To my question of what was disturbing 
peace in the camp, and why use a handbill, he just grunted inarticulately and 
flayed his arms around wildly. Adamantly he refused to furnish any further 
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explanation. I was convinced that something disturbing was afoot inside the 
Japanese compound, but my immediate reaction was that it hardly seemed appro-
priate, let alone just, to single out the putative peacemaker for punishment. The 
disagreement over what was occurring outside Camp Susupe could not be 
adequately expressed by the inarticulate garbage truck driver before me, if indeed 
he could ever convince himself to take me, a gaijin (foreigner) who represented 
the enemy, into his confidence-or so I reasoned, as I decided what to do next. 
As soon as the public safety officer arrived at the police station, I spoke to 
him at his office. He knew me well, as I had previously had dealings with him as 
Japanese area commander and, poss,ibly of some significance given the setting, I 
was the only American-trained lawyer in the naval military government on Saipan 
other than the judge. Exactly what I then said to him I cannot recall, but I am 
sure it would have been to alert him to the import of the matter coming up, in 
terms of maintaining both camp sanitation and internal camp harmony. Because 
of this I was there and ready to appear on behalf of the garbage truck driver if a 
formal charge were filed. Although the question of counsel being desired was 
nominally raised at all camp court proceedings, and as routinely waived, I was 
introducing a new element into the normal process. The driver was then called 
before the public safety officer, who told him that the police had charged him 
with fighting in camp. The driver's response was to admit that a fight had indeed 
occurred, but to deny having started it. The public safety officer inquired further 
of the police and then proceeded to lecture him on the seriousness of disturbing 
the peace and to warn him that he would be tried before a judge and sentenced to 
jail if it were to happen again. The legal argument I was already mentally formu-
lating to give before the summary court judge in defense offree speech and press, 
even in a military government compound, suddenly became moot. Far better to 
say nothing and hastily take my departure, with the garbage truck driver in tow. 
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Superficially, at least, life in the Japanese compound returned to normalcy, 
and so did the scope of my responsibilities. The garbage truck driver resumed his 
regular rounds, and if any further distribution of handbills occurred it was not 
brought to my attention. In the external world, however, normalcy did not pre-
vaiiL, and the Allies' successful prosecution of the war as reported in the news 
made it certain that the anticipated invasion of Japan was daily growing ever 
more imminent. For me, even ifI did not take part in what promised to be a 
bloody onslaught, it meant long years of occupation duty in Japan,. or so I had 
been informed when I entered the navy's Japanese Language Training Program. 
Then from Tinian, just a few miles away, the B-29 strikes that dropped their 
at€)mic loads on Japan were launched. For a few days an unstructured sense €If 
anticipation p'ervaded the military government officers' mess, much akin to the 
atmospheric tenseness that prevails just before a hurricane hits. Something was 
afoot, but what? Finally, in its full enormity the news broke: the Japanese govern-
ment was surrendering!, Its only other option was to face annihilation oftne entire 
nation. Gradually the complete details unfolded. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
each. destroyed by a revolutionary bomb developed by the United States, and the 
Japanese were capitulating. The emperor would broadcast this to the Japanese 
people and direct them to comply. The battleship USS Missouri would go to 
Japan, and on its deck General MacArthur, backed by a coterie of Allied military 
commanders, would receive the official surrender of the Japanese government. 
Uncontested' occupation by Allied forces would follow. Not only was all this 
communicated first via radio news, and then formal word from Island Command, 
but soon it was supplemented by recordings of the Japanese emperor's address to 
his people and by motion-picture films of the surrender proceedings. I made sure 
that the internees in Camp Susupe received all of this in its entirety just as soon 
as I had authorization to do so and, as well, discussed its import with the key 
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officials of the camp's Japanese internal administration. The result? The Japanese 
compound split sharply into two positions, with the civilians in each adamant and 
able-from their own perspective-to fully justify their position. 
To those who had been closely following the course of the war from the time 
Saipan fell, it was obvious that the invasion of the Japanese homeland was merely 
a matter of time. The pictures of the war devastation it had already suffered from 
American bombings lent credence to the described horror that befell Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, even if the scientific explanation of the destructive force of the 
atomic bomb was incomprehensible. The still photographs posted and the surren-
der movies projected in camp indisp~tably showed the USS Missouri in Japanese 
waters and that officials of the Japanese government came aboard the battleship 
to sign papers before standing Allied military officers, who in demeanor and 
action appeared neither downcast nor even constrained, but rather triumphant. 
The clinching argument was the record of the emperor's voice acknowledging 
defeat and directing the Japanese people to cooperate with the victors. To this 
group of internees, distasteful as it might be to have to admit it, hope for a stale-
mate was no longer feasible, and the war was over. The important question now 
was when were the Japanese civilians going to leave Saipan and be repatriated? 
Those who denied that the war had ended referred to almost the same 
evidence, but with their own interpretations of the significance of its details. The 
Americans had to go to Tokyo, because it was they who were surrendering to the 
Japanese. If Japan were really capitulating, it would have sent one of its warships 
to the United States carrying an envoy to sue for peace. Look at the clothes 
General MacArthur and the other officers wore: no dress uniforms, not even 
coats and ties, while the Japanese representatives were in proper gaijin (foreign) 
formal attire. The pictures of damage to Japanese places could have easily been 
falsified, designed to draw attention away from the Americans' own losses. And 
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as for the emperor's message, that, too, was a fraud, for only with the greatest 
difficulty could one understand the arcane Japanese in which it was couched. 
I believed that the schism within the Japanese compound would gradually 
heal. Over time the American GIs on the island, with whom the civilian workers 
had contact almost daily, would necessarily have to vary their routines in a 
myriad of changed ways that would ultimately bring all in camp to the realization 
that indeed the war was over and Japan had lost. What I had failed to take into 
account was that there might be internees so committed to the ideology of Japa-
nese invincibility that they would resort to murder to silence those who did not 
concur. This error was poignantly revealed ~y the stabbing death that occurred 
one dark night as the victim was asleep in his barracks. It is difficult to determine 
exactly why he and not someone else had been singled out. The man murdered 
was middle-aged, married, worked outside the compound during the day, had 
held a responsible position in the sugar industry before the war, and was regarded 
as a sound and dependable person. While he had publicly argued against the 
position taken by the diehards in camp, he did not playa leadership role in 
denouncing their views. 
An investigation conducted by the military government's civilian plumber, a 
former detective in the prewar Saipan government's police, led to the recovery of 
the death weapon from an open-pit latrine where it had been thrown. The perpe-
trator of the crime proved to be a college student who had arrived on Saipan 
from Japan to engage in agricultural field research shortly before the American 
invasion. Only long after the island was declared secured had he left the hills to 
seek the food and shelter of the Japanese compound. While working as a night 
clerk for the Japanese area's internal administration, his actions had attracted the 
attention of the camp's Chamorro guards, who surmised he was trying to signal 
to the Japanese military still hiding in the island's interior. However, it had not 
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been possible to confirm their suspicions and remove him from camp to the 
army's prisoner-of-war stockade. Later, with the war over, he was one of the 
civilians in the compound who vigorously denied that the news of the Japanese 
surrender was true. 
In retrospect, the uneducated garbage truck driver had presciently sensed the 
existence of a fundamental ideological cleavage in the Japanese area, and his 
appeal for peace had sought to ameliorate its impact. However, the full potential 
for violence that it concealed would not be revealed until the war was over, 
when, ironically, a more encompassing peace had been declared. 
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When at the University of Chicago after World War II, I found myself enrolled 
among some half dozen fellow students in the social sciences who had all served 
at the lower levels in military government-they in the European and Asian 
theatres. On sharing experiences, we found ourselves in full accord: military 
government as written up for the official armed forces reports of the war, as well 
as depicted in the popular literature pf the time, bore relatively little resemblance 
to what had actually happened in the field. Materially contributing to the disparity 
were the bureaucratic inadequacies of military government that tended to be 
glossed over in these accounts, particularly as contributed to by the cross-cultural 
ineptitude of the personnel staffing military government. 
As best I can reconstruct Susupe's initial traumatic period, those early days 
must have been chaotic, contributed to by inadequate preplanning and a military 
government staff insufficient in numbers and unprepared by training for the mag-
nitude of the task they would have to undertake. Rather than being in a position 
of succeeding to and running an ongoing government, they faced a total collapse 
of organized authority and an island in complete physical disarray. I can but con-
jecture the ensuing hectic flurry of activity, as when military government person-
nel, navy Seabees, army engineers,and interned civilians were all engaged in 
constructing what was to become a small city, erecting the barracks with materi-
als scrounged from everywhere, and digging the wells and pit latrines essential to 
making the area habitable. By the time I arrived on Saipan, all of what once must 
have seemed nearly incomprehensible confusion had been replaced by an orderly 
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municipality, with everyone observing regular routines. Authority for tending to 
various functional needs of the internees was parceled out among a number of 
specialized units of the naval military government. Concern for the remainder was 
left to Susupe's three separate civilian administrations, which also had the task of 
facilitating the work of the various units, including making sure the interned 
civilians complied with military government orders. In addition, as the basic 
administrative entities of the camp, they had the residual responsibility of 
responding to all municipal-type matters that did not fall within the jurisdiction 
of some other unit of the military government. 
Early in the life of Camp Susupe, the commanders of the three ethnic areas 
occupied posts high on the organizational chart otthe military government, but 
by the time I arrived on Saipan, these officers had been eclipsed in importance. 
Rather, as I began serving as the interpreter and assistant to the Japanese area 
commander, I found the administration of Camp Susupe divided into little func-
tional fiefdoms, the circumscribed turf of each being jealously guarded, and all 
superimposed on the three civilian administrations charged with residual concern 
for the general welfare of the internees resident in their respective portions of the 
camp. 
The three units of the naval military government responsible for supplying 
food to civilians, taking care of their health, and assuring their safety almost con-
tinuously impinged on and shaped the activities of the Japanese area's internal 
administration (yakuba). While the yakuba was charged with staffing and running 
the cookhouses, the food allocations the kitchen crews received daily from the 
Supply Office pretty well determined the pattern of meals the cooks prepared. 
The Supply Office also attended to payrolls and matters of finance affecting the 
civilians, as well as providing the supplies and equipment occasionally needed by 
the civilian administration. Crews under the supervision of the hospital serviced 
the camp's sanitation needs, while the dispensary it operated in the Japanese area 
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and the various services maintained in the hospital tended to the civilians requir-
ing dental and medical care. But of all the naval military government's units, the 
Public Safety Office was the one most constantly encountered. Unlike the other 
units, not only were its headquarters physically located in the Japanese area, 
rather than outside the camp, but the posts of its internal Japanese police were 
sited throughout Area 3. In addition, the external police, composed of Chamor-
ros and Carolinians, reported to the Public Safety Office and continously guarded 
the perimeter of the camp. 
A distinctive set of the naval military government's units was charged with 
responsibility for the various economic aspects of Camp Susupe life, some 
directly under the Economics Section and others separately administered but with 
their heads reporting to the navy lieutenant in charge of the Economics Section. 
Among those so separately administered were the Agriculture, Fisheries, Labor, 
and the Handicraft & Light Industries units. These economic activities touched 
the lives of all internees over school age other than the infirm and the aged. 
Except for rendering assistance as requested and bringing to my attention such 
general issues as indicated that internees were encountering difficulties in 
compliance, the Japanese administration abjured attention to economic matters. 
Correspondingly, to a great extent so did I. 
The remaining units of the military government affected other aspects of life 
in Area 3, but normally their activities were outside the scope of the Japanese 
administration's responsibilities. The work of one ofthem, the Legal Office, 
primarily touched the administration only through the repercussions emanating 
from the Provost Court decisions on civilian cases brought before it. Should 
kitchen personnel be found guilty of diverting food, the yakuba might respond by 
directing all dantaicho (section leaders) to take steps guarding against repetition. 
However, in anticipation of a guilty verdict, the yakuba would probably have 
taken proactive steps at an earlier stage, when the public safety officer first 
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framed the charges on which the case was based. 
Another unit in the military government organization-the Education, Wel-
far~, ;and Religion Section-worked closely with the civilian administrations of-all 
thFeeethnic areas in maintaining a school system for the children interned, with 
the welfaFe :and religious needs of Area 3 mostly attended toby the yakulJa. No 
~pr~Mision ihadbeen made in the naval military government plans foredllcation, 
;angllr~gll'lar teaching of classes evolved in camp out of a recreational and outdoor 
'ao1li,~ttYJi>'rogram. 'Civilians erected the buildings used for public schools in the 
[aJi>'anese :areaand on the farm. By the spring of 1945, children between the ages 
Qf'¢igbt :Rnd :fifteen were enrolled in thirteen schools. Attendance was voiuntary, 
andfonmer ~sohoolteachers conducted classes. The Red Cross furnished 'Some 
sClho~1 'stli~p1ies, the Hawai'i Department of Education sent textbooks printed in 
Engli9h, &e Offi:ce 'Of War Information contributed by publishing an English-
langu;a~e ;pr,imer,and the naval military government itself prepared a number of 
sim:~le!readers for use in the schools. 
When [ :ar:rive.don Saipan, some four thousand students were in school. 
Althoo'gh q,ymtva:l order the teaching of the Japanese language was prohibited, by 
necessity J ap.anese continued as the medium of instruction in Area 3, as almost 
no teachers possessed English-language proficiency. When compulsory English-
language dasses were instituted under naval order, with American nisei from the 
arm.y who had accompanied me from Hawai'i assigned as lead teachers, the 
Japanese civilians in Area 3 sought unsuccessfully to delay the introduction of 
teaching English until the fifth grade. They presented a petition stressing the need 
of the Japanese children for instruction in their own language. There was no 
indication that the officials of the yakuba took any formal part in mobilizing the 
mild protest, but I am confident that a public petition of this nature would not 
have been submitted without their having expressed support. 
It soon became apparent to me that the Japanese administrators in Area 3 and 
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A schoolroom in Area 3. (US Navy) 
civilians employed in subordinate positions of the naval military government had 
established working relationships that enabled their respective duties to mesh 
reasonably smoothly. A unit launching a new policy or introducing major changes 
might communicate formally through the area commander's office to the 
Japanese administration's office in the yakuba, in part to establish a paper trail. 
Normally a different process characterized the reverse flow of communications, 
reflecting the subordinate role !l>fthe Japanese civilian administration. As 
requested by that administration, I would informally communicate with the head 
of the unit whose jurisdiction covered the problem being encountered. Usually 
this signalled the inability of the Area 3 administrators to work out the difficulty 
with their civilian counterparts in the unit. Not infrequently, the problem traced 
back either to an obstacle, erected somewhat arbitrarily by the officer in charge 
of the unit, that the administration's contact could not ignore, or a personality 
clash between the Japanese civilians involved. Very seldom were matters for-
warded officially up the chain of command from my office, through the camp's 
executive officer, to the operational head of the naval military government. 
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I, .ofcourse, had no contact with the admiral who was theater commander in 
charge ,ofallmilitary operations on Saipan and, in addition to his other ,duties, 
was res'PQnsible for military government on the island. The same pretty much 
(beld rtrlJe for his deputy, an army colonel charged with administering theaffair·s of 
,CI:lll1;p6J;l.supe. I have no memory of having been introduced to the colonel when 
jo,i(\i~g ·1theSuSl;lpe staff. Rather my recoUectionof him is of a far diffetent na.ture, 
,centering :around the frame bouse, with walls of cariso matting {a -woven island 
lQYlteniail~ .lQ.cated on the swimming beach outside the camp's jciy~liM :area, which 
;~he ;coi()f;ijill tbad ,ordered built for his personal use. It was pointedo.at to me 
:dur~g lBilY ,of;ientation to Camp Susupe as the first "permanent"str;uctur.e -erected 
:b¥$Iile ~~lit~ ~oyernment-at a time when providing minimum shelter for 
:.(j¥~1i~Qs ~itl (r~ifled critical. Although separated by SOme distance fTarothe rest 
,<:>l~Qe"'Q;jjijc~s' t:erritory" on the beach, I .could occasion-a:Uy :see,and hear, the 
ICQ~¢I~JjI,d i,Qisguests from Island Headquarters enjoying the amenities of his 
,q.u~;(<$.,GjMel)the fact that Island Headquarters had been constructed atconsid-
ef;able !~,<i}$t mg\b ,~)fl the side ofMt Tapotchau, well above the heat of the island's 
lit:tli>'f.aiJ plain, ;~nd Navy Headquarters were similarly sited on heights closer to 
Bliiplil;n':s hltfib,or, I early .concluded that the military "brass" were not averse to 
ass-j,gning 'high primity to their own personal comfort. Perhaps I sbould not dwell 
top b.~.aYil¥ ,on this, for taking care of oneself had illustrations closer to home. 
Once the naval military government was out of its initial temporary quarters, the 
platform tent settlement that next served the needs of its personnel was soon 
replaced by ample Quonset facilities, separated for officers and enlisted men, 
each with its own mess and recreational facilities, and located on Saipan's best 
swimming beach. 
The attention of administrators to their personal concerns also could be 
observed in the yakuba, but given the situation, in far more constrained ways. For 
example, at their request, the budget of Area 3 made provision for a tea server to 
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be on the administration's staff. Her duty was to tidy up the premises and keep 
the officers supplied with cups of hot tea. The cost to the military government of 
the young woman's services was nominal-15 or 25 cents a day-but the symbol-
ism of the service contributed its mite to raising the status of the administration's 
dignitaries, and perhaps their comfort. For my part, given Saipan's heat, when-
ever I visited the yakuba it was only as a matter of courtesy that I would sip at 
the tin can, with its rolled-back lip and filled with steaming tea, that would 
immediately appear at my elbow. Camp rules required the Japanese administra-
tion officers, like all internees, to occupy places in the barracks assigned by the 
military government, and they were denied any ability to erect separate living 
quarters for themselves. However, I would not be surprised to have my suspicion 
confirmed that the space they enjoyed was less crowded than that occupied by 
the average civilian. 
Camp Susupe's naval military government held no periodic staff meetings, 
had no internal newsletter, nor offered any systematic interaction that would keep 
all informed of ongoing activities. I learned that the army colonel was no longer 
serving as our commanding officer only when I was told to accompany his 
replacement, a navy captain, to the Japanese barber and translate exactly how he 
wished his hair to be trimmed. Informally, the rumor mill within the unit alerted 
me to all of the scuttlebutt, including the occasional peccadillo. For example, a 
fellow officer was arrested by the Chamorro police at Charan Kanoa one evening 
for violating the nonfraternization rule by paying court to a nubile Chamorro 
miss, even though his courtship was primly conducted in the presence and with 
the apparent consent of her parents. 
It took me a while to grasp the full organizational dimensions of Susupe' s 
naval military government and understand how its various parts articulated. More 
significantly, this period offered me an opportunity to size up the character and 
competence of the officers holding the key posts in the units whose activities 
21 
SCljpan 's .Camp Susupe 
affected the lives of the Japanese civilians. Some of these officers had!partici-
paterl "with the original landing forces or had arrived shortly after, and were ·JilOW 
aw&iting ,rotation. One of them, my tentmate when I arrived on Saipan, II found 
~adyqn~ {morning walking on the sand near our quarters, ·gentlyteUing ,the ;waves 
;lap,ping l1t )tlle ~beach to go back. Becoming "rock happy" was a ,recogFiiooa ·sigJil 
iofiby;r;no]!~t ;a;nd ,basis for reassignment. Others of mycompatriets :weref'~oont 
"r~pla~~n:ts lUke me, and were still attempting to grow ,into the roles wh@se 
dim.~Ji1sions lha,d rbeen defined for them by theirpredecessQfs. iIn both ,cases {he 
i~:fi'(eet '~,as Ito'r;e\nforce the status quo, so that there was little ,incentive ,among the 
.o1~iQ~t:s ii.n :the ;l'nilitary government to initiate any maj or change. Their l1'eaotion Ito 
s.~~~s:t~ons ;Qr;~~in.ating from outside their own units was a!lrnost automaticaHy to 
fe~P9Jild In.~a(tjiM¢ly. 
!I ~~OQO. ~~~I11j1~§l rt!hat to be successful in achieving S()I:lle desired modification of 
,thejl~iVi~t:~S ,of :3 "mit in Area 3 where the express ,approval ofthe head otn.cer 
'~,~-S iI\~l~!l,i,r,ed, :i:t ;)MaS ~tirst necessary to develop a congenial relationship with bim. 
Wben ,~I;li1il i~~lll.nitypr:esented itself, the ,subject could be b.roachedand the 
~t:ij~W ,J;l.~gatiyis.tn mat otherwise could be anticipated dispelled . .once the way had 
bee1,1 :,p,Ii~par~.d, leould try more structured communication. SuperficiaUy, all of 
thisap;pear~d dia:metricallycontrary to the situation prevailing in the internal 
aclQli~·str.~tion of the Japanese area, but in fact it was not. 
In Area 3 the members of the Japanese administration also tended to be set in 
their ways, but they differed materially in how they registered resistance to a 
prQ:Po~ .change. Instead of immediately and openly raising objection when some 
modifi<;;ation was broached, nods of comprehension if not voiced concurrence 
could b~ observed, but, depending on the subject, might be followed by foot-
dragging in execution. For matters not ordered to be speedily implemented, the 
mayor might defer transmitting the directions until the next periodic meeting of 
the dantaicho (section heads), at which the means for collective compliance 
22 
The Many Faces of Bureaucracy 
could be considered. The resulting discussion could well result in execution being 
further delayed until at least another meeting, and sometimes longer. Here the 
internal structure of the Japanese administration was being used to slow down 
response. Only gradually would resistance to change give way to the 
"inevitability" of compliance. 
In July 1995, a half-century after the end of World War II, when attending 
the seminar held on Saipan to commemorate Camp Susupe, I heard with surprise 
the Reverend Vincent Prestagiacomo, who also had been invited from the United 
States, declare that the mission of the naval military government on Saipan 
during the war was to prepare the civilians on the island for democratic govern-
ment. He insisted that is what he was instructed in Hawai'i when, as an enlisted 
man, he was detailed to the military government team before it left for the 
Marianas. It is possible that this policy was intended for the indigenous inhabi-
tants of Saipan, but I saw little in the naval military government's dealings with 
the Japanese civilians to demonstrate that the inculcation of democracy was part 
of its objective. True, it did install a Japanese administration in Area 3 to tend to 
day-to-day affairs of the civilians there, just as Charan Kanoa (Area 1) was under 
a Chamorro-Carolinian administration, and Area 2 was in the hands of Korean 
civilians. But all of this was in conformance with the mantra of military govern-
ment that there should be turned over to enemy civilian nationals as much 
responsibility for their own affairs as was consistent with public policy and the 
best interests of all concerned. 
The primary purpose of this policy was to minimize the effort required of the 
military government to maintain internment, devoid of any accompanying ideo-
logical premise. Many in the naval military government considered the Japanese 
civilians untrustworthy, and there was a reluctance in Saipan to free them from 
regulation in economic, social, and administrative matters. There was no attempt 
by the military government to structure democratic institutions into the govern-
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!mental !fr.amewolk of Area 3, or to introduce the Japanese civilians to ,democratic 
~pr:~c.esses. The Japanese administration in Area 3 could hardly be considered an 
.e~press.ion of d.emocratic self-government. 
'f,c.\) ,h~ad theChamorro-Carolinian area, and perhaps provide some OGntinwty, 
\the Mv:~l tmilitarygovernment first named a person who had preiYiou~ly been 
,r,e~~ni~¢l ~bythepfewar Japanese administration as the indigenc)llI>S inhabitant5' 
,~leQted ,$(i)ice. ,On .}us death, rather than appointing a successor, the miilitarygov-
,emment i~lQwec!l~n indigenous males 0vereighteen years of age todect a new 
ae~'4l~,:~4i dle .same iprocess was repeated on that person's demi·&e. :Simitarl,o the 
~QIle~.s '\W)er~ penmitted to name the administrative leader ,of Area 2. However, 
i1l~Qer d:tlhlt~sesefV:ed as models for Area 3. 
'{,C,;) 1l\le.a41 ~~ 'J:apanese administration in Camp Susupe, the navatmititary 
go~er~ :~p!pointed tw.o individuals who had held important official ,posts 
\tl\B.aer \1l.be pif.eW~~sJapanese rule, and showed no interest in introducing into Area 
Jany )~l.ement ~fp.opu'lar s.election of the Japanese leadership. Passing over the 
(Qrmef mayor ofS.aipan·s largest city, Garapan, reputedly because ofms unpopu-
:lw.itf ;afflong,lapanesecivilians, the military government designated Mr Toshi-
m\it,su 'Shoji.oS mayor and Mr Taro Yanagita to assist him as advisor. Prior to the 
war Shoji had occupied the second highest administrative post on Saipan as vice-
may.or ,.0f Garapan. The elderly Yanagita previously had been district judge for 
th~ Marianas, holding a direct appointment from the Japanese emperor. For the 
most part the two served as co-mayors, meeting jointly with both civilians and 
military government officials, Shoji presiding and Yanagita seated alongside and 
occasionally interjecting some sage comment. Shoji supervised the half-dozen 
clerks at the administration's office. 
Coming into camp, normally civilians clustered in small groups based on 
friendship, common village ties, and the happenstance of having sought shelter 
together while hiding in the hills. As sheltering buildings were erected, the mili-
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Mayor Toshimitsu Shoji (right) and his assistant, Mr Taro Yanagita in their office in the 
yakuba. (US Navy) 
tary government would use these spontaneous groupings to assign one or more 
of them to a single barracks. There the occupants collectively would be called a 
han, each with its own hancho (group leader). The office did not play an impor-
tant part in the governance of Area 3. While most group leaders appeared to have 
been informally designated through consensus, it was not a position eagerly 
sought. Primarily the leader served as the communication conduit for camp and 
dantaicho's (section leaders') directions, and to him fell the unwelcome duties of 
chiding barracks occupants for failing to comply with existing requirements and 
acquainting them with those newly imposed. 
A number of barracks buildings were organized into dantai (sections), and 
additional sections were added as the population of the camp grew. By the time I 
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arrived.onSaipan there were thirteen sectiDns in the Japanese area, their numeri-
9al . designatiDn roughly identifying the .Order in which they had been established. 
DepeodingDn the capacities .Of the buildings in a particular sectiDn,Dvera thDu-
S.and ;p~rsons might reside in its area. Subject tD the approval .Of the naval military 
gov~rnweol, the Japanese administratiDn appDinted the head Dfeach section. 
A~sis:tiQ.~ him was a nDminal "advisDr" WhD in mDst cases served as section clerk 
:and ,collated the statistics required fDr internal camp repDrts. The maj.Or daily 
re.spo.n.silbility 9fthe sectiDn head was tD .Oversee his area's kitchen and its crew 
.ofwotk~rs .. .Ifnecessary, tD gain the attentiDn .Of the people in his sectiDn he 
would bang ,on the .empty sheli case Dr steei raii hanging .Outside his office for that 
;P;U:1jPo.~ .. 
E¥el}' two 'weeks the sectiDn leaders gathered around the I.Ong table on the 
p.ordi.:ofthe administratiDn' s .Office tD meet with the mayor and his advis.Or. 
Prim-adly tM$.e sessions served and were perceived as the means for naval mili-
.tarygoyemment .Orders and infDrmatiDnal nDtices tD be cDmmunicated tD the 
s..e.ction leaders .and thr.Ough them tD the civilians in all sectiDns. Little by way .Of 
cDUective policy formulatiDn Dr what cDuld be treated as the flexing .Of the sinews 
.Of $elf·jov.ernmentoccurred at these periDdic meetings. To the civilians of Area 
3, the .Officials .Of the Japanese administratiDn and the sectiDn heads appeared tD 
be sp.Okesmen fDr the naval military gDvernment, rather than representatives .Of 
the internees. 
Sharply cDntrasting with Susupe, in Camp ChurD .On Tinian the naval military 
gDvernment allDwed the internees tD elect the leaders and their assistants in the 
Japanese and KDrean areas. ProvisiDn was alsD made fDr camp councils CDm-
pDsed of representatives initially chDsen from the group leaders. In additiDn, the 
head .Of each administrative unit .Of the naval military gDvernment was directed tD 
have a civilian assistant. All .Of this served tD expDse the Japanese internees .On 
Tinian tD demDcratic fDrms and processes. Since I was nDt pDsted tD Tinian, I can 
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only relate secondhand observations that reported life in Camp Chura to be less 
constraining, families afforded more privacy, and the Japanese civilian administra-
tion there exercising greater power over and concomitantly sharing responsibility 
for matters relating to camp governance and internee welfare. 
Once the pattern of governance for Area 3 had firmed, the naval military gov-
ernment on Saipan had no plans for replicating the Tinian experience in Susupe. 
Buttressing this inertia of bureaucracy in retaining the status quo was the convic-
tion that organized Japanese armed resistance persisted in the hills of Saipan. 
Notwithstanding that the island had long since been declared secured, periodic 
night sweeps by US Marines would occasionally flush out isolated enemy person-
nel. The body ofa Japanese soldier, shot in ambush one night while attempting to 
raid the civilian farm, constituted my sole personal encounter with the killing 
aspect of warfare on Saipan. However, a full year and a half after D day, and 
almost four months after the war was over, Japanese Army Captain Sakae Oba 
marched out of the hills at the head of a band of 46 Japanese military, flag flying, 
and formally presented his sword in symbolic surrender of the island to the 
American forces. Given this confirmation of the continuance of organized enemy 
resistance, how much democracy could safely have been incorporated into the 
governance of Camp Susupe's Japanese civilians? 
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Maggie, and Coming in from the Hills 
As I sat down for lunch at the officers' mess, Maggie hurried over to my table. 
Was it true that a new group of Japanese civilians had just walked out from the 
hills and were now being processed, this before they were assigned a place to live 
in Camp Susupe? Not knowing the answer, I assured her I would inquire, a reply 
that carried a double meaning. 
Magdelina-for that was her given name-was one of the four Chamorro 
who waited on tables in the military government officers' mess. Although Ameri-
cans in the team referred to them all as "girls," Maggie's matronly figure and age 
clearly removed her from that category. Months before I had arrived on Saipan, 
her unfailing good humor and evident administrative abilities had placed her in . 
charge of the others, even though her command of English was minimal. Conse-
quently, as one of the language officers, when problems arose in the mess I 
would serve as interpreter, because like most Chamorros she spoke Japanese. 
Before the war, Maggie had married a Japanese resident on Saipan, a 
naichijin (person from the Japanese home islands). With her two children she 
was living on the outskirts ofGarapan, on the western side of the island, Saipan's 
major town and Japanese administrative headquarters for the Northern Marianas. 
By the fall of 1943 Japan had begun fortifying strategic places on its 72 square 
miles and expanding its military garrison. Anticipating an American invasion, 
some three months before D day the Japanese military had ordered all civilians 
out of Garapan, but allowed the Japanese living four miles to the south in the 
sugar town of Charan Kanoa to remain until American air surveillance began. 
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Civilians found hidingin a cave on Saipan. They were hungry, fearful, and dtessedin what 
remainedofthe :clothes they wore on the day they fled. (USNavy) 
Civilians fled the urban areas for their farms and ranches, or took to the hills, but 
alVwereilFpreparedtosustain themselves for long. Although Maggie hadhur-
riedly left with her whole family,in the initial confusion and then the utter devas-
tationofthe military operation that followed, her husband had become separated. 
This could easily occur, for the Americans advanced first southerly and easterly 
from their initial landings near the Nan'yo Kohatsu Kaisha's sugar mill at the 
outskirts of Charan Kanoa, and then pivoted and relentlessly moved northward. 
Atthe same time, the Japanese troops resolutely resisted as they retreated. Many 
civilians found themselves sandwiched between the two forces in the ill-defined 
line of battle. 
For the trapped civilians there were only desperate alternatives. One was to 
continue fleeing and ultimately commit suicide, as many did by jumping over the 
perpendicular Banaderu cliffs at the northern edge of the island, the males to 
avoid anticipated slaughter at the hands of the American troops and the females 
to escape the fate of rape they believed awaited them. Others attempted to 
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Chamorro waitresses in the military government's wardroom mess. 
Maggie is second from left. (US Navy) 
conceal themselves in the caves that honeycombed the central limestone 
backbone of the island and hold out as the fighting surged passed them. Most 
surrendered to the inevitability of being overrun and turned themselves in to the 
American forces. Maggie with her children opted for the last, and had been 
placed in the temporary stockade set up by the marines for Chamorro and 
Carolinian civilians. 
As a measure of the strength of her marriage vows, while the days stretched 
into weeks, and then into months, Maggie never lost faith that her husband was 
alive, hiding out in the "boondocks." As new people arrived in camp, she would 
hurry to inquire if they had any knowledge about him. At best she learned 
nothing that would serve to confirm her husband's death, but undaunted she 
continued to hope. After the stream. of newcomers eventually slowed to a bare 
trickle, I tried to have the Camp Susupe's registration staff always include a 
query about Maggie's husband in the interviewing process that preceded 
admission. The responses were always negative. Some seventeen Japanese men 
who had married indigenous women before the war were eventually admitted to 
the Chamorro-Carolinian part of Camp Susupe after they returned with their 
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families from the hills, and this probably buoyed Maggie's belief in her husband's 
eventual return. 
The first civilians had started stumbling into the American lines within hours 
after the United States forces had gone ashore. It was essential that they be 
removed from anywhere near the combat area to ensure the success of the mili-
tary operation. Their physical presence could not be permitted to interfere with 
the forward advance of the American forces, their communications, and transport 
of their supplies. Japanese soldiers masquerading as civilians must have no 
opportunity to infiltrate the American lines, and vigilance had to be continuously 
maintained against the threat of sabotage by civilians. In addition, the spread of 
disease to the combatant troops could only be prevented by furnishing medical 
care to civilians and seeing to their sanitary needs. For all of these practical 
reasons, apart from humanitarian concerns, stockades for civilians were quickly 
erected. 
The Fourth Marine Division set up three civilian stockades in its crowded 
landing area. When the Twenty-seventh Army Division later came ashore, it did 
the same. Meanwhile the Second Marine Division erected a stockade for Japa-
nese civilians on the beach and began work on a camp for Chamorros and Caro-
linians a little inland, between the sea and a nearby marsh-like area behind its lines 
known as Lake Susupe. Five days after the invasion began, all combat forces 
were directed to transfer the civilians in their stockades, regardless of ethnicity, 
to the Lake Susupe area. Thereafter, as the line of fighting moved up the island 
and other temporary holding areas for civilians were set up, their occupants, too, 
would soon be moved to Camp Susupe. 
Preinvasion plans had called for using both Charan Kanoa and Garapan to 
shelter the civilians caught on the island by war. However, the air bombardment 
and naval shelling that had preceded the landings, and the fighting that engulfed 
Japanese-fortified Garapan as the American troops advanced, so devastated the 
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town that little could be done other than bulldoze the rubble away. With the 
rehabilitation of the structures still standing in Charan Kanoa, and the building of 
wooden duplexes, the thirty-five hundred Chamorro and Carolinian survivors 
remaining on the island would eventually be housed there. In November, when 
they were transferred from the stockade, the crowded Japanese civilian internees 
overflowed into the hovels vacated. Lost on some of the Americans was the 
significant reversal in status of Japanese and indigenes that all this movement 
symbolized: before the war, not only could no Chamorro or Carolinian reside in 
Charan Kanoa, but it was a criminal offense for them to be caught after sunset in 
this exclusively Ja.panese area. Now they occupied the superior housing of 
Charan Kanoa, which was declared out of bounds to all Japanese, who, as 
inferiors, lived in relative squalor. The terminology adopted by the military 
government designated Charan Kanoa as Area 1 of Camp Susupe, notwithstand-
ing its physical separation. Together with the far more populous Japanese com-
pound, officially identified as Area 3, and the adjoining barracks housing one-
tenth as many Koreans (Area 2), all three were integral parts of Camp Susupe's 
naval government administration. 
In practice, based on the ethnicity of the civilians in question, the naval 
military government on Saipan observed differing policies of protective custody. 
The Japanese, whether from Japan or from Okinawa, were enemy aliens, with all 
the negative connotations that designation engendered, and were to be dealt with 
as such. Since the Koreans had been brought to Saipan to work on the sugar 
plantations from their homeland occupied by Japan, they were regarded as 
reluctant colonials, nationals of a state destined to be independent again someday. 
The Micronesians had for long been subservient under Spanish and then German 
rule, and most recently had suffered the administration of the Japanese under 
League of Nations Mandate. They were considered liberated peoples, the rightful 
inhabitants of Saipan, to be treated indulgently as unsophisticated and childlike, 
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now unfortunately caught up in the vicissitudes of war. Shortly after the incep-
tion of military government these indigenous peoples were kept apart from the 
Japanese, and so were the Koreans. As a consequence, the attitudes of the mili-
tary government personnel in the housing, feeding, and treatment of these three 
major groups differed in ways that mirrored the military government's ethnically 
distinctive containment policies. 
The appalling conditions under which civilians at first lived when gathered in 
protective custody served to reinforce the attitudes of military government per-
sonnel. Hungry, thirsty, sick, some with untended wounds, and others trauma-
tized by shock, they entered camp demoralized. In the early period as many as a 
thousand civilians a month died from malnutrition, wounds, and disease. Once 
beyond the stage of eating K rations, they cooked the food distributed to them 
over fires built with scavenged wood~ Only gradually were temporary shelters 
improvised from GI and Japanese military tentage, tarpaulins, and ponchos before 
more substantial structures could be erected. Little wonder that seeing this 
squalor and human degradation, the mind-set of some of the military government 
personnel was to regard whatever was done by way of housing, sanitation, and 
care for the internees as being far better than what they were accustomed to-
and for which they should be eternally grateful. As enemy aliens, the Japanese 
were considered to be in the poorest position from which to complain about the 
care received. In the parlance of the time, while all of the internees were "gooks," 
they were at the bottom of the civilian heap, and to be treated accordingly. 
As it most charitably can be described, the planning for the military govern-
ment phase of the Saipan invasion proved inadequate. The officers and enlisted 
men assigned to the marine civil affairs detachment and the naval military govern-
ment team were ill prepared for the tasks they faced. Recorded history reveals it 
was only at the intervention of the Pacific Ocean Area Command that several 
thousand tons of supplies for the relief of civilians had even been loaded, and they 
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did not reach the naval military government team until very late. This tonnage 
included no shelter materials. Incongruously, not so delayed were the printed 
questionnaires, registration forms, and laborers' identifying armbands, which 
somehow were taken ashore on the first day! Many months later, when I joined 
the military government team, I could sense a residue of resentment among the 
unit members for whom improvisation necessarily had to be the order of the day 
as they faced the enormity of the problems raised when the moorings of an entire 
population are suddenly destroyed. I was told that in the initial fighting, civilians 
would infiltrate through the forward lines at night to abandon their infants to be 
cared for by the Americans and fade back into the boondocks. The next morning 
the team would find the infants. The first shelter built in the camp on Saipan was 
for orphans. According to the records, the day after the marines landed they 
found themselves with a thousand civilians who had appeared in their midst, all 
requiring some form of assistance; three weeks later the number of civilians 
interned had increased eightfold; and by 1 August, the naval military government 
was responsible for the care of some sixteen thousand civilians. The complexity 
of the needs demanding solution that confronted the naval government only grew 
as the number of interned civilians multiplied. 
No transport had been assigned for military government use, and none 
allotted to it specifically was to arrive on Saipan until ten months after D day. 
The naval team's orders authorizing it to commandeer any Japanese equipment 
found proved meaningless. Most of the Japanese vehicles were inoperable due to 
the damage they had sustained, and the few that could run had been immediately 
seized by the marines, who were first on the ground. As one of the enlisted mem-
bers of the military government team commented at the 1995 commemoration 
anniversary of Camp Susupe, "Who was going to argue with a US Marine driver 
in a Japanese truck pointing a rifle at you?" With whatever motor transport could 
be begged or borrowed from other units, and with the effort materially aug-
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mented by use of the bull carts that had been commonly used on the individual 
farms before the war, the team set to work moving back to the area of Camp 
Susupe anything that could possibly be used for feeding, sheltering, clothing, and 
otherwise meeting the needs of the internees. This foraging became ever more 
systematized as Japanese vehicles were repaired, and when supplemented by 
American transport. Tons of discovered supplies that had been stored by the 
Japanese military for the provisioning of their own troops were moved to the 
camp's supply yard. Civilian women riding on trucks with an American driver 
went out daily and returned to camp with salvaged vegetables growing on the 
prewar farms scattered over the island. Anything from Garapan and its environs 
that could possibly be used as building materials, or to make life in camp more 
tolerable, was similarly gleaned and trucked back to camp. 
Meanwhile, civilians were called on to assist in the camp in many ways, such 
as serving as stretcher-bearers and nurses, and making up teams for burial duty. 
Internees prepared bandages and surgical dressings until sufficient medical sup-
plies were delivered. Once beyond the temporary efforts at improvising shelter, 
all ethnic groups were set to work under the direction of army engineers and 
navy Seabees building single story barracks out of the salvaged materials. Japa-
nese civilian surveyors laid out their location as the camp plan took form, as well 
as marking where wells were to be sunk, pit toilets dug, and cookhouses placed. 
The outlines of a small city emerged as the number of camp occupants swelled 
and additional facilities were added to house them. 
Beyond attending to the most immediate needs of the civilians as they came 
into camp, it was considered essential for security that any Japanese military 
personnel among them masquerading as civilians be identified and separated out. 
Questioning by intelligence officers during this initial phase of the registration 
process, supplemented by the knowledge of Chamorros on staff of the Japanese 
civilians resident on the island before the war, sufficed to expose most impostors. 
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Nevertheless, until almost the end of the war, the occasional Japanese military 
man who had succeeded in slipping through the screening was disclosed as living 
in Susupe and sent to the army's distant prisoner-of-war camp. Despite the aura 
of punishment that reference to incarceration immediately conjures, ironically the 
members of the Japanese armed forces as prisoners of war received better treat-
ment, whether food, housing, or the rate of pay for work performed, than did the 
civilians in Camp Susupe. International law clearly defined the minimum stan-
dards to be observed for captured military personnel, but no comparable norms 
of clarity were applicable to civilians. In general, Camp Susupe needed only to 
observe the more ambiguous constraint raised by the general requirement that 
humane treatment be furnished. 
The registration procedures institutionalized in Camp Susupe served to 
provide a complete personal record for each internee, replete with photograph 
and thumbprint. From these were later issued identification papers, which the 
internees were to carry at all times under pain of punishment. Once the barracks 
were erected, each internee was assigned to a building in which to live, and 
unauthorized transfer subjected the internee to arrest and court trial. Questioning 
during registration permitted recordation of each internee's education, prior work 
experience, and potentially useful skills, all of which facilitated the assignment of 
everyone of employable age to an appropriate job, whether inside or beyond the 
boundary fences of Camp Susupe. 
The process of registration of all civilians resident in the camp was an 
unending chore. Initially, at the time of maximum internee intake, only minimal, 
temporary records could be made, so that the internees had to be summoned 
back for reinterview and completion of the full, formal dossier. Births in camp 
and the continued dribble of new entrants coming in from the hills contributed to 
an ever-growing number of registration files; approved changes of residence, 
marriages formalized in camp, and deaths had to be recorded; and there were 
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always new data to be added, as for immunizations. As a result, even when 
World War II ended, the registration of all internees in the formal camp records 
had not been fully finalized. By that time it was a common joke among staff that 
due to rotation of military government personnel to assignments off-island, no 
one was left on the team who could read the fingerprints so laboriously amassed, 
should the need for matching them ever arise. 
The battle lines moved closer to the northern tip of the island, and two days 
after the last desperate banzai charge of the Japanese military, on 7 July, the 
island was declared "secured." Officers in Army Intelligence moved with the 
American forces, including Americans of Japanese ancestry who spoke Japanese 
and several of the language officers detailed to the naval military government.· 
Their role was to urge civilians hiding in the hills to surrender. Attempts were 
made to dissuade remaining Japanese military from detaining them, so that they 
could "come in." Under the circumstances, this constituted a very dangerous 
assignment. Their handheld, portable bullhorns, and the heavier equipment with 
loudspeakers mounted on jeeps, exposed their positions to sniper fire. Then, too, 
Japanese military concealed among groups of surrendering civilians always 
constituted a threat. While considerable success was achieved in encounlging 
civilians to turn themselves in, a number held out and straggled in over the 
following months as subsistence in the hills became ever more difficult. 
After most of the civilians remaining alive on Saipan were interned in 
Susupe, and had settled down to the routine of camp life, it was possible to 
literally sense the presence of each new arrival. For one thing, a smelly aura 
·US policy did not countenance Americans of Japanese ancestry serving in. the navy. I 
had experienced the myopia of this policy when I brought a contingent of army enlisted 
Americans of Japanese ancestry to Saipan from Honolulu at the end of 1944 for service in the 
military government. Special permission had to be obtained to pass them through the Pearl 
Harbor gates and over to the seaplane base. Although they were not trained language 
interpreters, their oral competence in Japanese enabled them to conduct classes in the camp 
schools and materially implement various other camp administrative functions. 
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enveloped them. They had hidden out for many months in dank, dark caves. 
Short of catching rain, they had little water to drink, let alone to. bathe or wash 
their clothes, which, after their original clothing wore out, normally consisted of 
ill-matched garments expropriated from the bodies of the dead. As part of this 
garb consisted of salvaged Japanese uniforms, it also carried the risk of their 
being shot by the US Marines on their periodic night patrols, mistaking them for 
Japanese military also remaining in the hills. Even after they bathed and were 
issued new clothing, the new arrivals remained visually distinct from those 
already in camp. Having long become night people who emerged to search for 
food only after the sun had set, their skins had turned pasty white, giving them 
the appearance of walking ghosts. Indeed, until fully adapted to camp ways, in 
their unfamiliarity with established camp routines they kept themselves apart, like 
people from another world. 
With the war over, the civilians interned in Camp Susupe responded to the 
announcement of the Japanese surrender in a variety of ways. One visitor to the 
camp told how Maggie cried when she heard the news and remarked that she 
wanted to go to Japan with her children to live with her husband's parents. 
Although this information was recounted as a display of Maggie's grieflinked to 
Japan's defeat, I interpreted it quite differently. Finally, at long last, Maggie had 
to face the cruel reality that her husband was never coming in from the hills. 
(Many years later I was told by a Chamorro informant that Maggie had 
remarried, and with her American husband had moved to California-but I 
cannot vouch for the accuracy of this conclusion to her story.) 
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The invasion of Saipan introduced the civilians on the island to American law, 
albeit in a form embodied in military orders and normally enforced peremptorily 
by military personnel. For some of the indigenes this was the fourth time in their 
own lifetimes that they had to become familiar with a new system of law. First 
Germany succeeded Spain, and then with World War I was replaced by Japan. 
Unlike the American legal system, with its common law underpinnings, all of the 
others were code based, but to the civilians interned in Camp Susupe this made 
little difference. To them, American law seemed to consist of nothing but a 
bewildering array of dos and don'ts, which they failed to observe at their own 
peril. Some of the orders were reduced to writing and translated into Japanese, 
but probably few civilians ever more than glanced at them. Rather, most orders 
with which they were conversant had been orally communicated by military 
personnel or relayed to them by other internees, probably in garbled form. Only 
as the days of living within the confines of the camp's barbed wire stretched into 
weeks and then months did the internees come to identify the orders that the 
military government had initially issued as safeguards to cover all contingencies 
and had then slowly relaxed as it found them unnecessary. Many such orders 
came to be enforced mainly in the breach. Similarly, the civilians gradually 
invented a myriad of ways to attempt to circumvent those proscriptions that were 
observed. Only if they became caught up in the legal process, as when formally 
charged with violation of some order, did they have occasion to experience how 
the American system oflaw extended beyond mere literal reading of an order's 
text, and could expand exponentially out of precedent. They also learned that the 
41 
Saipan's Camp Susupe 
American system did not countenance enforcement by obtaining confessions 
through duress, knowledge that was reinforced by cases brought before the mili-
tary government's provost court against civilian policemen from the Korean area. 
In anticipation of the landings on Saipan, a series of proclamations had been 
prepared under the name of Admiral Chester Nimitz, and once the fighting per-
mitted, these were prominently posted. Proclamation No. I declared that the 
admiral had assumed full powers of government over the Mariana Islands and 
ordered prompt obeyance of all orders. It was followed by Proclamation No.2 
on war crimes, starting with a list of offenses punishable by death, and then a 
longer array subjecting offenders to fines and imprisonment. Eventually nine 
proclamations were issued, on such subjects as courts, Japanese money and the 
closing of financial institutions, narcotics, seizure of property, and a wide gamut. 
of police and security regulations on meetings, publications, radios, photography, 
and intoxicating liquors. All of these were supplemented by Island Command 
orders, Camp Susupe general orders, and specific orders (both oral and written) 
issued thereunder by military government personnel. The Nimitz proclamations 
suspended all powers of the Japanese empire, but incidentally also declared that 
violations of Japanese penal law in effect prior to the occupation could be 
brought to trial before American military courts. This.last, with its reference to 
Japanese penal law, was to suggest an avenue by which I would later handle a 
dilemma. 
Once military guards were replaced by civilian police forces, in addition to 
guarding the entire periphery of the camp, the Chamorros and Carolinians trained 
by the army military police also served as the internal police for Charan Kanoa, 
the Area 1 of Camp Susupe. For the rest of the camp, the Japanese and Korean 
police forces patrolled their respective areas and in general ensured compliance 
with camp rules, enforcing the observance of sanitation regulations, stopping the 
display of lights after dark, catching thieves, preventing gambling, breaking up 
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physical disturbances, and otherwise maintaining peace and order. While 
American military personnel were prohibited from entering any of the three areas 
of the camp without permission, the Japanese and Korean police discovering the 
presence of an intruder could only raise an alarm to summon the external guards 
and were under strict orders not to lay hands on any American. Any GI so 
apprehended within the camp was charged and tried before the military court 
having jurisdiction over his unit, and not before the camp's provost court. 
On occasion I would visit the military government legal office outside the 
main gate of the Japanese compound to observe the trial of civilians by the 
summary court for violation of some military order. Formal charges would have 
been sworn to by the public safety officer, who received his information from the 
arresting policeman, and would then be heard by the legal officer serving as 
judge. Previously the court had been held in the Japanese Police Headquarters, 
since by virtue of Area 3's predominant size, most cases involved Japanese 
civilians. After the venue was changed, on days of holding court, policemen 
escorted the arrested defendants out through the camp gate and into the legal 
office, and they remained in a small dock in one corner until, seriatim, they were 
called before the desk of the judge. Each was advised of the offense with which 
he was charged, including a reference to the section of the specific order violated. 
The public safety officer served as prosecutor. Routinely counsel was waived and 
practically always the civilian pleaded guilty. Rarely was any evidence 
introduced. 
In their barest essence, the court proceedings were not much different from 
those observable before countless justice of the peace courts in the United States, 
where persons charged admit guilt and throw themselves on the mercy of the 
court. But on Saipan the process was both far slower, as everything had to be 
translated between English and another language-the defendants might be 
Carolinian, Chamorro, Japanese, or Korean-and the punishment meted out was 
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apt to be severe. A civilian's failure to observe the enforced proscriptions of the 
military law was treated as a challenge to be summarily punished. To do other-
wise might be mistaken for weakness and lead to more egregious flaunting of 
military authority. 
A great number of the cases brought before Camp Susupe's summary court 
involved internees trying to smuggle goods-food, candy, cigarettes, linens, 
nails, almost anything-into camp and being caught in the act. Initially, early 
after the invasion, everything scrounged by civilians permitted outside camp was 
distributed among all those interned or, particularly as to foods, stored for later 
use. An individual's securing undue benefit was thereby foreclosed. Later, the 
justification for banning internees from bringing anything into camp rested on 
reasons of security and discouraging the theft of American governmental and GI 
personal property from the areas where civilians were assigned to work. For 
attempting to smuggle into camp four packages of gum worth twenty cents, 
concealed in his leggings, Kana Oshiro was sentenced to hard labor for thirty 
days, a punishment Akamine Koshin also suffered for hiding in his shoes two 
pieces of candy, approximate value two cents. 
Since all civilians in Area 3 returned to camp through a gate guarded by 
Chamorro and Carolinian policemen, which subjected them to at least individual 
scrutiny and frequently included a brusquely administered body search, to avoid 
being caught with illicit goods some civilians resorted to throwing contraband 
over the camp fence while riding on a truck when returning from work. Another 
ploy was to conceal goods outside the camp's perimeter, but close to the fence, 
and retrieve them surreptitiously through the strands of barbed wire after entering 
camp. 
Identification cards and red-cloth labor strips issued to all workers enabled 
maintenance of labor records and distinguished camp internees from persons still 
remaining in the hills. Losing either subjected civilians to court-ordered punish-
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ment. Even when voluntarily reported when seeking a replacement, the loss 
brought the imposition of a fine, although sometimes it was suspended at the 
discretion of the judge. 
All fraternization between internees and military personnel was peremptorily 
prohibited. That it was nevertheless frequently occurring was evidenced by the 
detected unsuccessful attempts to bring back the gifts civilians had received or 
their purchases from GIs of cigarettes and other desired articles not readily 
available in camp. The summary court judge tended to respond to all such inter-
actions as deliberate affronts to the military government. It alone, as distin-
guished from all other military units on the island, had right of control over the 
civilians and their contact with Americans on the island. While the judge had no 
jurisdiction over the GIs who were parties to the fraternization, if indeed they 
could even be identified, he appeared determined to punish any civilian who had 
the temerity to violate the nonfraternization order. 
Proceedings of the summary court for Susupe were posted on the public 
bulletin boards and in the camp newspaper-the Marianas Hiho-complete with 
name of the internee, statement of charge, court finding, and court sentence. 
Almost all prisoners ordered confined were placed in the camp's central jail, and 
there received the regular food ration of two meals a day. For sentences over six 
months at hard labor, confinement was in the army's distant prisoner-of-war 
stockade. It was normal to order all males found guilty to be confined at hard 
labor, but the work to which they were assigned belies the image such designa-
tion conjures of a sweating chain gang condemned to rock-splitting labor under a 
tropic sun. A more accurate picture is conveyed by one of the cases brought 
before the summary court of several jailed civilians who were charged with con-
cealing themselves and sleeping for several hours while on a work gang detailed 
to duty outside the jail. Given the depressing conditions under which the average 
Japanese civilian lived in camp, except for being deprived of the social freedom 
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enjoyed by nonincarcerated civilians, as well as the opportunity to obtain a third 
meal when working for another military unit, apparently the internees did not 
consider the court-ordered jail stay an onerous punishment. In a number of cases, 
probably, of greater moment was the loss offace among one's peers for having 
been unsuccessful in outwitting the guards when attempting to sneak contraband 
into camp. And unquestionably conviction by the court of an act considered 
nefarious by the civilians in camp subjected the person jailed to serious social 
opprobrium. 
After I had settled into the routine of facilitating the day-to-day functioning 
of the Japanese area, I gradually became aware of various minor camp orders and 
restrictions applicable to the internees whose justification had long since lapsed. 
Even if not enforced, however, given the very nature of military government, the 
civilians ignored them at their own risk. In many cases the origins of these orders 
could be traced back to situations that no longer existed, but although the ratio-
nale for their imposition no longer held, no effort had been made to expunge 
them from the camp's lists of dos and don'ts. A good illustration was the prohi-
bition against the ringing of bells in Area 3 before 0800. Its genesis lay in the 
early period of the camp when the quarters of the military government's com-
manding officer were located close by the Japanese area, and his sleep was dis-
turbed by the ritual clanging of gongs for early Buddhist worship. Once the 
colonel moved into the separate house erected for him on the beach some dis-
tance away from the camp, the need for this order aimed at securing his comfort 
had ended. Nevertheless the banning persisted and continued to place a damper 
on religious services in camp. 
I recognized that an order initially intended to achieve one objective might 
accrete other values, so that the lapsing of its original justification did not neces-
sarily dictate that it be expunged. The rule of thumb I applied in identification for 
effectively cancelling those orders whose original raison d'etre had eroded was to 
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consider the nature of the proscribed activity. As a lawyer I was familiar with the 
distinction in criminal law between acts considered malum in sei (inherently bad) 
and those treated as malum prohibitum (merely prohibited by law). Murder well 
illustrates the first, leaving one's car beyond the permitted parking period the 
second. Almost all of the camp prohibitions that appeared to have outlived their 
justification fell within the second class and could safely be eliminated. This ratio-
nale-from the perspective of time, probably more aptly phrased as rationaliza-
tion-did not as neatly fit the problem faced when the Island Command one day 
decided to imitate God, and hurl one of the Ten Commandments onto the camp. 
As once long ago proclaimed from Mt Sinai, but now in the form of an 
order emanating from Island Command high on the side ofMt Tapotchau (near 
the center of the island), and relayed through the military government command, 
it was declared: "There shall be no adultery in Camp Susupe." Via the grapevine 
I was made to understand that this was aimed at the Japanese area, where it was 
rumored that civilians were "living in sin." Apparently a highly placed visitor to 
the area had indignantly complained to Island Command that Japanese men and 
women were cohabiting without being married to each other. I did not have the 
least idea how many men or women might be living together, and who among 
them were not married, let alone mutually married. Given the expressions of 
dismay communicated to me by the internal Japanese administrators when I 
acquainted them with the issuance of the order, I concluded that the numbers 
affected were not minuscule. 
Well might they be large. Not only had whole families been ripped apart by 
the invasion, with one of the spouses killed, but before the Americans had landed 
on Saipan some women had been sent back to Japan with their children, leaving 
their husbands on the island. The severance of all communications with the 
homeland made it impossible to learn whether any of these wives in Japan had 
survived the American air attacks and were still alive. Meanwhile on Saipan, 
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living crowded together in cramped quarters and subject to the nightly curfew 
that kept all close to their assigned barracks in the unlighted camp, it was to be 
expected that sexual liaisons would occur over time, irrespective of the marital 
status of either of the partners. Should a man and a woman live together and 
comport themselves as appropriate for a married couple, with the woman per-
forming such household tasks as attending to laundry chores and mending, while 
the male as provider scrounged for needed articles and maintained a pile of fire-
wood for brewing tea, the sharing of tasks would materially contribute to the 
maintenance of orderly camp life. The Marianas Hiho--the camp newspaper-
occasionally carried articles on the names of persons being married and where 
they were going on their honeymoon, the place designated being the building to 
which they were being assigned to live as a married couple. This only served as 
evidence that internment in camp, discouraging as conditions might be, did not 
foreclose romance. 
From camp records it could have been ascertained whether an adult civilian 
had declared married status at the time of registration. Although this information 
was supposed to be routinely obtained, in part to facilitate the housing of fami-
lies, such notation of itself would have been insufficient to identify the adulterers 
in the camp. To accomplish this, systematic investigation would have to be 
undertaken, with barracks-to-barracks inquiry launched. Was a missing spouse 
dead, still hiding out in the hills, or alive in Japan? It might also be detected from 
the tone of this account that I was not particularly sympathetic to initiating 
drastic action designed to sever the various linkages that might have formed 
between men and women and made life for them in Camp Susupe a little more 
tolerable .. On the rare occasion when a Japanese military man masquerading as a 
civilian had been discovered in camp "shacked up" with a civilian woman, and 
was ordered removed to the prisoner-of-war stockade, I was painfully aware of 
the interned woman's grief, particularly when she was pregnant and concerned 
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with maintaining ties for the benefit of the expected child. 
When the press of my duties permitted, over time I had engaged in discus-
sions with the former Japanese District Judge Taro Yanagita, about Japanese 
code law and how it had been applied before the war. Within the camp the judge 
now served as a senior advisor to the mayor of the Japanese area. From these 
talks I was acquainted with the subordinate role Japanese law afforded the 
woman, and that what was considered "adultery" for a woman did not apply 
equally to a man: a married woman committed punishable adultery when she 
engaged in consensual intercourse with a man to whom she was not legally 
married, but not the converse with respect to a married man. Indeed, male 
infidelity apparently did not furnish justifiable grounds for legal separation or 
divorce of spouses. 
Although probably not anticipated, the original Nimitz proclamations 
providing for prosecuting preinvasion offenses before American military courts 
were broad enough to include the Japanese crime of adultery, despite the sex-
biased skewing inherent in Japanese law. This was kantsu, and in my dictionaries 
in English was defined simply as "adultery." All I had to do was follow the 
instructions I had received and literally translate into Japanese for Area 3 the 
order: "There shall be no adultery in Camp Susupe." This automatically elimina-
ted half of the problem raised by excluding all men. As for the married women in 
camp, the Japanese administrators opined that they would not engage in any 
conduct that was not countenanced by Japanese mores or prohibited by the 
former Japanese law. And since while I was on Saipan no charge of adultery 
being committed in the Japanese compound was ever brought before the provost 
court, perhaps they were right. 
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One of the physical mementos I brought back from Saipan, and kept for a 
number of years before discarding everything but the memories of Camp Susupe, 
was a photograph of two metal plates. Centered on each, as I recall, was a scoop 
of rice flanked on one by a serving of vegetables stewed with meat and on the 
other by a small piece of canned meat. Accompanying each plate was a salvaged 
C ration can filled with soup. They fairly represented the typical total food ration 
daily issued in camp to a non-worker. The pictures were taken by the naval mili-
tary photographer and accompanied my report on the food problem in Susupe to 
the military government commander. When I arrived on Saipan I found that the 
major disgruntlement of the Japanese internees was centered around food, and 
subsequently, little that was done to alleviate it seemed to make much difference. 
In the first few days of the fighting, the military's ubiquitous K rations were 
fed to the starving refugees, and drinking wat~r was doled out to them from 
drums said to have been brought from Hawai'i. Only about two hundred tons of 
the food loaded for the military government-rice, corned beef, and canned 
salmon-were landed on Saipan during the early combat period, and these were 
not opened until a full three months after D day! Meanwhile, to supplement and 
then replace the GI ready rations, edible vegetables found growing on the scat-
tered farm plots were used to feed the internees, along with salvaged kegs of 
pickled plums, cases of canned fish, straw-sacked rice, and other foodstuffs that 
had been stockpiled on the island for use by the Japanese military. Eventually, 
some twenty-five hundred tons of these enemy food stores were diverted to 
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Food stores stockpiled by the Japanese were used to feed the internees. (US Navy) 
civilian consumption, probably exceeding in weight all of the rations loaded on 
US ships and brought to Saipan for the same purpose. Not only did they initially 
contribute substantially to keeping the civilians alive, but until the carefully doled 
out supply of captured soy sauce and other condiments ran low, they literally 
provided the spice of camp life. During the fighting, considerably more Japanese 
military stores had been discovered and could have been so diverted for camp use 
if they had not been wantonly destroyed by the American military or allowed to 
rot through exposure to the elements. The GIs had come ashore on Saipan after 
being warned to avoid drinking all local water because it had been poisoned by 
the Japanese; it was but a logical extension for the Americans to equate the odor 
of the unfamiliar foodstuffs with a comparable danger. 
Prior to the invasion of the Pacific, the navy's Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery established a minimum daily diet of 1,530 calories for civilians. It was 
admittedly insufficient to provide all the nutrient elements necessary, but was 
designed to prevent starvation and reduce disease. Later, on Saipan, this mini-
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mum was increased to 1,824 calories, and dry stores were supplemented with 
vegetables from the camp's cooperatives and much later with fish caught by the 
camp's sampans. Civilians performing heavy labor were fed increased diets, and 
all working outside the camp for other military units received an extra meal from 
them, normally in the form of C or K rations. 
As demonstrated by the picture I had taken, what may have been judged 
adequate in calories by the medics did not necessarily correspond with what the 
civilians' stomachs told them was satisfying. Accustomed to a diet of rice and 
vegetables, and only minimal amounts of meat or fish, the internees were now 
receiving small amounts of concentrated foods without the normal accompanying 
bulk. Cumulatively, both meals consisted of about one to one-and-a-third pounds 
offood per day. Further disturbing the internees, once the supply of captured 
Japanese rice dwindled, the imported rice shipments failed to keep up with camp 
needs, and the Supply Department frequently distributed beans as a supplement 
to or substitute for rice. The limited supply of Japanese condiments available to 
the cooks for seasoning the food, as well as the institutional manner in which that 
food was cooked and distributed, also contributed to the dissatisfaction. In Area 
1, raw food was allotted to each indigenous family group and then prepared by 
them according to their taste. But in Areas 2 (Korean) and 3 (Japanese), for 
sanitary reasons, workers from the various suijiba (cookhouses) picked up the 
food daily from the Supply Department and cooked it communally before divid-
ing it up and distributing it to each shik'sha (barracks) according to the number 
of civilians it housed. Only late in the life of Camp Susupe were makeshift 
fireplaces appearing in Area 3 to prepare individual meals. 
The sheer size of the refugee tide necessitated mass methods of feeding, 
once the civilians were weaned off temporary rations. Not only were prewar 
cooking facilities destroyed, but most cooking utensils as well as dishes and 
cutlery were trashed or buried in the rubble. Initially large breadfruit leaves 
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served as plates for some civilians, and the cans that had held GI rations were put 
to use for drinking soup and tea. As Camp Susupe took shape, provision was 
made in each dantai (section) in Area 3 for a suijiba where crews could work 
under the supervision of the chief cook. Each suijiba housed a row of gigantic 
iron caldrons, in shape similar to those open-mouthed pots once found on old 
whaling ships and used to render the blubber of the oceans' behemoths, salvaged 
from the destroyed Japanese sugar mill where they had been employed to 
crystallize sugar from the juice of crushed sugarcane. 
Early each morning, before anyone else in camp stirred, the kitchen crews 
were up, lighting the fires under the caldrons cradled in their holding platforms 
made from scrounged bricks, and boiling the rice and other foods destined for the 
first meal of the day. Without any form of refrigeration, all unprepared foods had 
to be distributed and consumed on the day of preparation. One of the jobs of the 
crews was to haul the necessary firewood from the pile maintained on the side of 
the camp to the suijiba, and there break it up into kindling that would be stock-
piled for later use. The first few suijiba built were cramped, and the crews would 
necessarily perform part of their culinary duties, such as cleaning and chopping 
vegetables, on tables outside under the shelter of an overhanging roof or tree. 
This practice also allowed them to escape the heat of the cooking fires, which in 
the afternoons ofSaipan's hot, humid days became near intolerable. With the 
building of more commodious, screened kitchens, for reasons of sanitation the 
handling of all foods was moved inside as much as possible. Most of the members 
of the suijiba crews were women, and numbered as many as eighteen. The 
yakuba selected the chief cook of each suijiba for his culinary skills and adminis-
trative competence on the recommendation of the dantaicho (section chief); I do 
not recall any woman serving in the capacity of chief cook, although it was 
obvious that some women were directing the observance of the daily minutiae. 
Crucial to the Japanese diet are both miso and soy, the former a fermented 
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A communal kitchen in the new Ku. (US Navy) 
rice paste and the latter a sauce made with soy beans. Miso shiyo (a miso-based 
soup to which shavings of katsuobushi [smoked bonito] are added) is an impor-
tant part of a Japanese meal, and the camp cooks attempted to observe this tradi-
tion. Fortunately large supplies of soy sauce and miso were among the stores 
stockpiled by the Japanese military and were used to good advantage by the 
cooks. So, too, were their split bamboo containers, which were carefully hus-
banded and repeatedly used for delivering food to the individual shik'sha and to 
store foods in the suijiba, as for the making of suimono (Japanese-style, salted 
pickles) out of surplus vegetables delivered from the farm. When the salvaged 
Japanese supplies began to dwindle, green rice "starters" were obtained from the 
naval military government on Tinian, which by then was producing its own miso 
for interned civilians there. Susupe then succeeded in fermenting enough miso to 
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otherwise destined to be delivered to the camp, cooked, and rationed out for 
individual servings was diverted, but the miso so consumed was included in the 
Supply Department's computation of daily caloric intake. 
Close to fifteen tons of sweet potatoes, yams, taro, breadfruit, eggplant, and 
onions were garnered for the feeding of civilians in the first month following the 
invasion. Even more vegetables were obtained in the next few months, but by 
November this source had begun to drop markedly. Meanwhile, efforts were 
underway to have the internees grow their own produce. Some 140 families, each 
consisting of about five individuals, were formed into two farm cooperatives, one 
for Chamorros and Carolinians from Area 1 and the other, far larger, for Japa-
nesefrom Area 3. Impounded Japanese equipment was divided between the 
farmers, .and the navy supplied additional tools and seeds. Bulls pulled small 
plows to till the soil and bull carts moved the produce to the ~o-op Headquar-
ters. Under military government supervision, the cooperatives chose their own 
officers, set production targets for members, and provided technical assistance in 
growing unfamiliar crops. The military government regarded the manner in which 
the·cooperatives conducted their own affairs as an introduction of the internees 
to democratic government. 
The land used for the cooperative farms was considered to be property of 
the Japanese government and therefore available to the military government. As 
an indication of its fertility, it produced four truck crops a year. Each family 
initially received a 2t;2-acre (1 hectare) allotment ofland, on which it usually 
threw together a ramshackle shelter for protection from passing rain showers or 
the heat of the noonday sun. By the end of the war the two cooperatives were 
farming 500 acres, the little individual plots identifiable from a distance by their 
varying shades of green and brown, all grouped together on the rising land situ-
ated behind the camp at the base ofMt Tapotchau. Besides fertility, the con-
gruence of plot boundaries and the distance from camp determined the area 
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incorporated, as security was furnished the civilians-against both American GIs 
during the day, and Japanese military hiding in the hills and bent on looting the 
farms at night. Each day the internees walked to and from their farms, escorted 
by military police guards, a trek of half an hour or so each way. 
The naval military government contracted to buy on a per-pound basis all 
fruits and vegetables produced by the two cooperatives, and the proceeds were 
distributed to members according to their respective contributions. Pumpkins, 
squash, lotus root, sweet potatoes, soy beans, eggplant, various leafy vegetables, 
and bananas materially added to the bulk of the produce going into the camp. 
Together with whatever could still be salvaged elsewhere, by the end of the war 
the total amount was over two hundred tons a month. But the cooperatives were 
also producing such "exotica" as tomatoes and sweet corn, some of which con-
tributed to the reputation gained by the military government messes of being the 
best on the island. With access to these farm products, the naval military govern-
ment obtained an added bonanza: Its "gift" of a few sacks of fresh corn or crates 
of ripe tomatoes could accomplish miracles in securing parts otherwise unavail-
able on the island for the repair of camp equipment, or for obtaining the special-
ized services of a technician loaned by a US naval vessel long out in the Pacific 
and now visiting Saipan with a crew hungry for the taste of fresh produce. 
With Saipan overrun by the American military, the naval military govern-
ment assumed responsibility not only for all civilians but also for all farm and 
draft animals delivered into its care. They grew into a small herd of runty cows 
and bulls, some goats of either sex,and a motley collection of chickens, ducks, 
and geese. The birds were cared for on the farm, and meals in the officers' mess 
sometimes included eggs prepared in various styles, which I assume originated on 
the farm. However, I do not recall ever eating chicken or duck, irrespective of 
source. 
Very occasionally, when the herd became too large, I would be asked to 
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serve as interpreter for an army veterinarian who would examine the animals 
singled' out for slaughter,. and later their carcasses, for signs of disease; He had to· 
be there to witness the killing, for once an animal was despatched and:its meat 
certified; because of the lack of refrigeration the quartered carcasses wereq~ickly 
sent to the suijiba to be cooked. The fresh meat was a welcome variation ,from , 
the normal ,diet of canned, mostly processed meats. My memory ofthisdistasteful 
duty is leavened by the knowledge that the act of slaughtering was the responsi .. · 
bility of the farm, not myself, for while the deaths of the cows and'bullswere 
relatively quick and merciful, some of the old goats tenaciously clung to life, 
refusing to die until repeatedly beaten over the head. 
The immediate trauma of the invasion had long been· spent by tHe time Ii 
arrived l on Saipan, andto my untrained eye the internees appeared'pliysically fit. 
whether, workers in:groups checking out to board the trucks taking them to 
work, boisterous children on their way to school, or familiesstrungoutin;albng, 
meandering line on their trek to the Japanese cooperativefarm; The navy doctors 
attending them assured me of the adequacy of the internees' diet, and 'dismissed-
their; complaints as mere griping. The same reaction was shared generally-by the 
other officers in the military government team, who voiced a number ofexpH'ma-
tionsfor the dissatisfaction: For one, inefficiency in the camp's distribution, 
system was held to result in food being wasted or not-evenly divided; even worse; 
deliberate favoritism resulted in the diets of some internees suffering. Another· 
explanation had some of the food being secretly sent to the Japanese military still· 
hiding in the hills; although sufficient food was going to the camp. the internees-
were-denying themselves in order to further their own military's resistance. To 
prevent such activity, camp rules prohibited any food being left in the farm 
kitchens or small shelters on the cooperative farm, and required that- everything 
taken there for meals be consumed or returned to camp. Underpinning all of 
these explanations was a general attitude of dismissal, for after all it was only a 
58 
Food 
matter involving the dissatisfaction of "go oks," most of whom were probably 
eating better than they ever did before the war. I might inquire into the adequacy 
of food in camp, but I was acutely aware of not overstepping the fine line that 
would have me appear to be coddling "gooks" and have the epithet "Jap lover" 
affixed to me. 
The Supply Department furnished monthly summary reports on the amount 
of food going into camp, which the internees questioned. Lacking were details on 
the food received by the various danlai. Enlisting the cooperation of the camp's 
Japanese administration, I set out to remedy this hiatus by having each suijiba 
record daily the poundage and varieties of the foodstuffs delivered. After a few 
experimental attempts at drafting a form suitable to record almost all of the food-
stuffs that might be distributed-this was long before the era of the computer-
developed spreadsheet-a single-sheet report was duplicated and distributed to 
all suijiba. Meanwhile, to serve as measuring devices, the Japanese administra-
tion fashioned simple balancing-pan scales out of salvaged scrap metal, so that 
the workers in each suijiba could weigh and record the daily food distribution. 
These reports served a triple function: for me, as summarized from all the 
reports, they provided a rough measure of each day's food receipts and also the 
ability to check on any glaring discrepancies in the normal flow of food into 
camp. With respect to the charge that food dissatisfaction in camp was due to 
maldistribution in Area 3, there was now a functioning system that tracked all 
food from the Supply Department to the suijiba. Probably of equal importance, 
since a copy of each report was also prominently displayed at the suijiba, the 
civilians fed by a particular kitchen could find out what foods were received that 
day and could be expected to raise objections should they not appear in what was 
allotted to them. 
The system of routine, repetitive reporting seemed to fit well with adminis-
trative patterns familiar to the Japanese. Insofar as inquiry could determine, the 
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kitchen workers were conscientiously carrying out their reporting duties. They 
appeared to welcome the opportunity afforded by the reports to demonstrate that 
they were not responsible for the minimal size or disapproved content of the 
internees' food ration. In short, after a few glitches were removed, the system 
worked as intended. In fact, too well. My office soon became deluged with daily 
food reports,and as most of the chore of handling the paper flow fell on me, 
eventually spot checking superseded any attempt to maintain an ongoing, 
comprehensive review. 
When I became Japanese area commander I found myselfeKpectedtopar-
ticipate in a number of activities that had become institutionalizedas.part of camp 
life. One was a formal suijiba inspection each month. Early on the appointed day, 
the chief officers of the yakuba would call at my office, and we would all then 
proceed in a·long line, I at the head, the mayor accompanied··by his senior advisor 
following, and a retinue ofyakuba clerks bringing up the tail. All that was 
missing to complete the comic opera appearance was a brace of drummers or 
trumpeters heralding our passage. The function of the clerks was to record 
everything commented on. I found it easier to conformto what the Japanese 
considered to be the proper role of the area commander than to invent anew one. 
At each suijiba we were met by the dantaicho, his clerk, thesuiji-cho(chief 
cook), and behind them the suijiba workers. For the occasion the clothes the 
kitchen crews wore were demonstrably cleaner, even if somewhat nondescript. 
After being welcomed, the procession would thread its way through the suijiba. 
In anticipation, both it and the grounds outside had been swept clean, all utensils 
inside orderly stored, and all cooked and opened canned food placed in covered 
containers. It was expected that I would open the doors in at least one of the 
kitchen cabinets to observe how carefully and neatly its contents had been 
arranged. If the cleaning were not thorough, scraps of food found left around, 
chopped firewood piled haphazardly, or anything else untoward discovered, all 
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was dutifully noted by the clerks. They would later revisit the suijiba to prepare a 
follow-up report. Since the sanitation crews maintained by the camp hospital 
routinely checked all suijiba, as well as the health of the kitchen workers, and 
would certainly order unsanitary conditions ameliorated, I rather sensed that 
officialdom in the yakuba looked on these periodic visits as one of the means for 
exercising administrative control over camp life. Meanwhile, a suijiba found 
wanting in a formal investigation-one ordered not by the yakuba but by the 
naval military government-afforded the Japanese administration an opening to 
censure or even remove personnel. 
On one of the inspection tours after the system of daily food reports had 
been installed, I was startled by a suijicho with long service calling me aside to 
proudly point out how he had cached a half dozen or so of Supply Department 
issue, monster-sized loaf cans of processed meat, to be available for his danlai's 
food should an emergency arise. He had been a cook since the early period of the 
camp, when the food distributions by the Supply Department were irregular due 
to insufficient warehoused foodstuffs and undependable shipping schedules, and 
had developed the practice of setting aside a small store of canned food as insur-
ance against interruptions in supply. At once I recognized that the practice held 
the potential for fundamentally subverting the whole recently installed food-
reporting system. But I also appreciated the depth of personal commitment to the 
welfare of the danlai's people that the chief cook was displaying and was in no 
position to assure him that the conditions of the war had changed and that need 
for hoarding food no longer existed~ I temporized, complimenting him on his 
foresight, but counseled against increasing the size of the cache, now that food 
supplies appeared to arrive regularly on the island. 
The trade store for the Japanese area and several of the private entrepre-
neurs licensed to engage in business were sources of foods that provided a little 
variety by way of supplement to the daily issue in camp. To the end of providing 
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an incentive to work, improving camp morale, and not so incidentally preventing 
the accumulation of excess money in camp, a candy shop and a bakery also had· 
been licensed and periodically made wholesale purchases from the Supply 
Department. The internees could buy from the trade store basic seasonings such 
as salt and pepper and such luxuries as jams, peanut butter, tea, and coffee. When 
they could get the necessary raw materials, the bakery sold bread and the candy 
shop manju·(Japanese-style cookies offlour dough filled with sweetened beans). 
Even though the internees were rationed in their purchases, the goods available 
frequently ran out, and lots were drawn to determine who could buy those 
remaining. All pricing was regulated by the military govemmenttobe:.appropriate 
to a laborer's pay scale but also to permit a small profit. llike manju, but after 
sampling it and approving its quality I felt uncomfortable in purchasing more and 
deliberately refrained. I was enjoying ample food at the mess, and I knew that 
there never was going to be enough manju to meet the demand in camp. Each 
piece I ate would deprive some civilian of the opportunity to enjoy the variation 
from suijiba fare that it symbolized. Probably needless to add, the Supply 
Department included foodstuffs sold to internees as part of the allotted·totals of 
all foods going into camp when computing the caloric content of the food issued 
to the civilians. 
After the war was declared over, and computing the "points" necessary to 
return to the United States and be demobilized monopolized the attention of 
almost all in the armed forces on Saipan, Mayor Shoji approached me with a 
novel suggestion. Now that the war was behind us, and the Americans were 
getting ready to go home, would it not be a nice gesture if the Japanese cooks in 
Area 3 prepared a Japanese-style meal for the officers of the military government 
before they left Saipan? After all, some of the best chefs on Saipan were interned 
in camp, and they could cook a variety of delicacies certain to please the 
American palate. When I carried the proposal to the officers' mess, some 
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responded initially with a degree of suspicion and a few expressed abhorrence of 
Japanese food. This negativism was overcome by the pragmatic realization of 
others that it was fairly late in the game for the Japanese internees to be plotting 
to poison the military government team. To remove all objections, the mess 
would prepare an alternative lunch for those disliking "gook" food. I brought an 
affirmative answer back to the yakuba, together with an agreed-upon date; all 
that remained was to make the necessary plans and assemble the required 
utensils. 
The yakuba sent the designated chief cook over to the kitchen of the 
officers' mess with a list of the raw foods that would have to be requisitioned and 
made ready. Very early in the morning of the appointed day, a cooking crew 
appeared at the kitchen to prepare the meal and worked steadily until noontime. 
The officers entered the mess hall, some a little apprehensively, but soon were 
enjoying a sumptuous feast of vegetable tenpura (raw vegetables dipped in egg 
batter and cooked in hot oil), a tasty sukiyaki (meat and vegetable stew), and cha 
wan mushi (a type of custard). Many seemed a little squeamish about dipping 
their slices of maguro sashimi (raw tuna fish) into soy or mustard and eating it 
raw, and did not appear to take kindly to the taste of the miso soup or the 
suimono (salt-cured pickled vegetables). The cooks had laboriously chopped 
carrots, bamboo shoots, and lotus root into minute pieces the size of rice grains, 
and mixed them with the cooked rice, so that the officers were offered a unique 
starch substitute for plain boiled white rice. I considered it a deliciously success-
ful meal, and so did those of my colleagues who were at all familiar with Japa-
nese cuisine. All that was lacking was warmed Japanese sake, but any that may 
once have been on the island had long since been consumed. 
On the conclusion of the meal I went back to the kitchen to thank the cooks 
and praise them for their efforts. I found them neatly cleaning up after their 
morning's work and preparing to move the leftover cooked food back to camp. 
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And what a surplus: dishpans full of the rice combined with diced vegetables, 
mountains of tenpura, containers full of cooked sukiyaki, slabs of raw maguro 
thinly sliced into rectangular, bite-sized pieces, in all enough food to have served 
a military government team many, many times larger than our allotted size. Not 
only did the officers of the naval military government mess eat well on that 
memorable day, but so did a greater number of Japanese civilians, probab~ forr 
the first time since they had been interned in Camp Susupe, 
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Vast schools of pelagic fish migrate through the waters of the western Pacific, 
and Saipan's prewar catch of some fifty thousand pounds daily during the height 
of the fishing season had provided an important source of food for the naichijin 
(people of Japan). In particular they were supplied with katsubushi, a unique 
essential of their diet. After being boiled, katsu (bonito) fillets are slowly smoked 
over low fires until they resemble chunks of dried wood, and become so hard that 
like it they can be whittled with a knife. Shavings of katsubushi are added as 
flavoring to the traditional Japanese daily dish ofmiso shiyo (a soup made from a 
fermented rice base). Scrounged Japanese military stores of katsubushi held in 
the warehouses of the naval military government's Supply Department had long 
since been depleted by the time I arrived on Saipan. However, shortly after D day 
it was not a replacement supply, but the catching and distribution offresh fish 
that began commanding the near full-time attention of the fisheries officer and his 
staff attached to the naval military government. The preparation of katsubushi 
was not renewed on Saipan until near the end of the war, when it would have a 
negligible impact on civilian food consumption in Camp Susupe. But it was a 
different story with the fresh fish caught under the auspices of the military gov-
ernment. By June 1945 the daily catch would be more than sufficient to supply 
the civilian population on the island, with the surplus distributed to the military. 
In the following month as much as five thousand pounds of dressed fish were 
being distributed daily to the American armed forces. 
When "softening up" the Japanese defenses on Saipan, part of the military 
objective was to destroy any Japanese craft that might threaten the landings or 
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interfere with the supplying of American forces ashore. Simultaneously, the 
Japanese were scuttling their craft so that none could fall into American hands. 
As a consequence, every one of the sampans in Saipanese waters that had been 
used to catch fish, whether moored close to land or standing offshore, was sunk. 
Coincidentally, at the same time the campo (bombardment) also destroyed all of 
the land installations used to handle fish and service the fishing fleet. If fish were 
to be caught again and provide a meaningful supplement to the supplies being 
transported to Saipan, the military government fisheries officer would somehow 
have to rebuild the former fishing industry out of the devastation war had 
brought. While the navy military government sections of the chief of Naval 
Operations in Washington and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Operations 
Area at Pearl Harbor debated the possibility of initiating large-scale fishing 
projects in the Pacific, the fisheries officer on Saipan, mostly by begging and 
borrowing, patched together a jerry-built operation that succeeded in once again 
landing a significant amount of fresh fish. 
My initial reaction when talking with the fisheries officer was to discount the 
difficulties he was encountering. There were United States naval vessels of every 
size and description in the waters all around Saipan, so why not borrow some 
small boats and drop a few lines overboard to catch fish? The response revealed 
both the general unwillingness of the navy to make anything that floated available 
for Japanese civilian use, and the necessity of having specially designed craft and 
employing appropriate fishing techniques if fish were to be caught in numbers 
sufficient to make the effort worthwhile. Bonito were plentiful in Saipanese 
waters, the prewar Japanese fishing methods had been effective, if crude, and in 
camp there were skilled bonito fishers who could be put to work if only they had 
the necessary equipment. The first priority was to locate the sunken sampans and 
determine which were salvageable. Once raised, they could be repaired and refur-
bished; needed parts could be cannibalized from those not worth salvaging. Some 
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Japanese internees at work in the revived the fishing industry. (US Navy) 
of this work could be accomplished by trained civilians from camp, but essential 
was the assistance of military personnel from other units, and the use of their 
equipment-which was almost always arranged on a personal basis completely 
outside the formal chain of command. The island was combed for unused military 
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materials that could be diverted to the project or nominally borrowed if their 
outright transfer as declared surplus could not be cajoled. 
After long hours of diving, eight Japanese sampans were raised, only to find 
that the engines of those with sound hulls defied repair. Eventually six were fitted 
with American engines and made ready. Several small boats for catching bait 
were also restored. During this period the military government's boat repair yard, 
in the Saipan harbor had to be repeatedly moved, as the area occupied continued 
to be reassigned for other military uses. Five months after D day, the first Japa-
nese sampan was believed in condition to begin fishing, but then establishing 
seaworthiness took an agonizingly long time. Ignobly, craft would, have to be 
towed back to the military government's fishing docks for further work. During 
this period of frustrating delays, only the devoted commitment ofthe fisheries 
officer and his staff prevented abandonment of the entire project. 
While the materiel problems were being confronted, and one by Qne 
resolved, personnel matters also had to be faced. The employment experience 
shown on the personal records of civilians in Area 3 was sear:ched to identify 
internees with diving, mechanical, shipwright, and welding skills. Sometimes 
obtaining their release from the units in which they were already working and 
their reassignment to the fishing project necessitated considerable perseverance in 
securing the cooperation of the military government personnel concerned. Crews 
of fishermen had to be assembled, but despite the seeming simplicity of the task, 
unexpected complications developed. Some of the men shown on the camp 
records as civilian fishermen proved to be Japanese military who had successfully 
entered the camp under the false claim of being fishermen caught up in the 
invasion while temporarily in Saipanese waters. Normally, Japanese military 
seeking to live in Susupe and avoid the prisoner-of-war camp could be identified 
and separated out because they were not known to the civilian scrutinizers as 
island residents. But for those claiming to be fishermen, this test was turned 
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against itself, for such transients would necessarily be unknown by the civilians 
on Saipan. Only through testing the skills of the putative fishermen was it possi-
ble to catch the impostors, remove them from camp, and ultimately select trained 
crews from those remaining. That they had indeed been fishermen before the war 
was reinforced by an incident shortly after the project had succeeded in landing 
fish. To a man, they objected about the manner in which they were being paid, 
protesting that it violated the traditional way fishermen the world round were 
remunerated by each receiving a share in the value of a vessel's catch. 
An entirely different range of problems confronted the fisheries officer after 
he had surmounted his materiel and personnel difficulties. One of them was 
securing bait. Customarily bonito are caught on dry, unbarbed hooks, the fisher-
men holding poles and casting their lines into schools of fish biting in a frenzy at 
what they perceive to be small fish attempting to escape them. The whole process 
depends on having the necessary bait to release on one side of the sampan, with 
the part fleeing consumption by the bonito then being scooped up on the other 
side to be reused, and water sprays continuing the illusion of their presence. 
Saipan does not enjoy large stocks of small fish suitable as bait, so the small 
boats would have to spend considerable time searching inshore waters. Once 
netted, the bait fish would be transferred to the sampans' bait wells before the 
sampans could put out to sea and start to fish. As something of an ironic note, 
the bays and waters that yielded the most bait fish were those where the navy 
anchored its vessels or secured them to docks. The debris the vessels dropped 
into the water served as food for the bait fish and attracted them in ever larger 
numbers. But the navy authorities refused to allow small boats crewed by Japa-
nese civilians to be anywhere near an American ship, let alone come close enough 
to net the school of little fish sheltering in its shadow. They raised as objections 
the potential breach of security, the affording to enemy civilians of an opportunity 
to engage in sabotage, and the sheer duplicity of the Japanese, which made them 
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inherently untrustworthy. The same reasons were advanced when, loaded with 
bait fish, the sampans sought permission to put out to sea. But then the additional 
obstacle was raised that the Japanese civilians might use the sampans to escape 
from Saipan. 
Satisfying responses had to be fashioned for each of the objections raised. A 
navy craft could accompany the "fishing fleet" and armed naval personnel could 
be placed on the sampans before they left shore. On the charts of the ocean 
surrounding Saipan, areas would be delineated where the sampans might sail; all 
other waters would be off bounds. Also, security limits were to be set around 
each naval vessel, with the civilians on a vessel of the military government 
punishable for violating them. Gradually, navy opposition was overcome, andthe 
fisheries project came ever closer to the day when it could be put to the test. 
Once the sampans were operational, some doubters even began to concede it was 
not impossible that fish might be caught, but would the volume be sufficient to 
make the whole effort worthwhile? 
Work in camp kept me so busy as to lose track of the day-to-day develop-
ments in the fisheries project. I was vaguely aware that the effort was continuing, 
for the fisheries truck with its load of men would take off from camp each morn-
ing and come back late in the afternoon. One day after the rest of the· camp's 
labor crews had long finished and returned, the fisheries truck drove jubilantly 
into Area 3, piled with open boxes holding a catch of bonito. It had just delivered 
fish to both Charan Kanoa and the Korean area, and now proceeded through the 
Japanese area, dropping offfish at each of the suijiba. Food for the second meal 
of the day had already been cooked, and here were piles of fish being delivered at 
the suijiba doorsteps, with no way of holding raw fish until the following day. 
Camp Susupe did not have a single refrigerator in which the fish might be kept, 
nor did the military government's Supply Department. That is why, when a farm 
animal was to be slaughtered, all of the suijiba scheduled to receive meat from 
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the carcass were notified in advance and the distribution of the meat so timed that 
it could be cooked on the same day. There was no alternative but for the suijicho 
in each dantai to recall his workers. While some cleaned the fish, others rekin-
dled fires under the giant caldrons and filled them with water. Once cooked, the 
fish could be kept without refrigeration for the following day's meal. 
Once the technical success of catching fish had been demonstrated, rather 
than signaling the opening of a bright new future for the camp, the operation only 
compounded problems both inside and outside camp. The amount offish landed, 
not just whether any would be caught, remained uncertain. Sometimes sufficient 
bait could not be netted; other times, when the sampans were loaded with bait 
and ready to leave, no naval escort was available to accompany them. Once out 
at sea, if lucky they might catch sight of a flock of screaming birds hovering over 
and diving into the ocean, marking the presence of small fish evading a school of 
larger fish feeding on them by attempting to escape to the surface where they fell 
prey to the birds. But before the sampans could approach close enough to release 
their bait and begin fishing, the school of bonito might move on to another part 
of the ocean off bounds to the sampans. And of course, the weather was not 
always cooperative, so the prospect ofa large, steady supply offish to feed the 
civilians in camp faded. Without refrigerators, chilled fish could not be held for 
later distribution. How could the Supply Department of the military government 
be sure of furnishing a daily ration containing the requisite calories without 
foreknowledge of the volume of fish that would be available? My hunch is that 
the Supply Department pretty much continued to follow its regular routine, and 
looked the other way so long as relatively few fish were entering camp. 
The handling of fresh fish by the cooks could in no way be regarded as a 
task equivalent to the preparation of truck crops harvested from the cooperative 
farms. About the only comparability was that the kitchen staff made suimono 
(Japanese pickles) out of some of the excess greens brought into camp; similarly, 
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when cleaning fish, they might save the fish guts to be salted and stored away in 
bamboo casks as shiogara (salted fish entrails). Once sufficiently fermented. the 
shiogara could be used as a seasoning when cooking food. Beyond this, the. 
parallel failed, for the fish-handling chore was a far smellier task and required 
considerable attention to sanitation requirements. Until the garbage. truck made 
its rounds, the fish detritus consigned to the converted steel oil drums serving as 
garbage cans emanated strong odors. From the viewpoint ofthe· people in camp~ . 
the success of the fish-catching project, while welcome; had somecnegative 
aspects. 
Bonito is an oilier fish than albacore, skipjack, or its otherrelatives:with 
which Americans are familiar as "tuna," and it also has a greater c.antent· of dark, 
stronger-tasting meat. Because of this, or the uncertainty ofthesupply~ the. 
messes of the military units on the island did not initially embrace enthusiastically 
the inclusion of fresh fish as part of their meals. the smaller muro (baby. mack~ 
erel) taken by seine net and ~he turtles occasionally caught were all welcomed for 
camp consumption. 
Eventually a surplus reefer, sufficiently large to store several days' antici~· 
pated catch, was located on Guam. After the normal delay in completing the. 
necessary paperwork, it was brought to Saipan and installed on the military 
government's fishing dock. No longer was there any compelling urgency each 
day to quickly transport all landed fish from sampan to ultimate destination or 
risk having the catch spoil. Further reducing the pressure that had characterized. 
the initial stages of the project was a new development promising to handle all of 
the surplus fish that might not otherwise be consumed. 
The economics officer of the naval military government saw in the catching 
of bonito an opportunity to resurrect Saipan's katsubushi industry, devastated by 
the war. The services of a number of civilians experienced in filleting and cooking 
the fish were engaged, and production gradually started in a small shed erected at 
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the edge of camp. Day after day the katsubushi crew sweated over the banked 
fires, tending to the boiled fish drying out over the coals. However, rather than 
regularly delivering the finished product to the camp for preparation of meals, 
they stored it away in barrels and soon filled a small warehouse built on the side 
of the shed. I never knew exactly what the economics officer intended to do with 
the new product, but suspect that in line with the military government's objective 
of rehabilitating the island economy, he was anticipating recreating an industry 
that would sell its products outside Saipan once the war was over and a degree of 
normalcy had returned to the world. 
I retain three vivid sensory memories of Camp Susupe, one of sight, another 
of smell, and the third of sound. The first is the look of utter incredulity and 
consternation that spread across the face of the economics officer when one day, 
on inspecting the stored katsubushi, he found it riddled with holes as though 
unknown worms had chomped their way through each piece. The memory of 
smell involves the stench of rotting fish parts pervading the camp whenever there 
was an unexpected delay in emptying the garbage cans adjacent to the suijiba 
after fish had been delivered. And the third memory is of not hearing Kimichan 
sing again. This last· requires explanation. 
The naval military government's records for the internees in Camp Susupe 
were kept in an office that opened onto mine, and were maintained by a half 
dozen civilians under the direction of a navy chief yeoman. Kimichan was the 
youngest member of the group, a diminutive roly-poly of a woman around twenty 
years of age. When working she would sometimes spontaneously break out in 
muted song, which I enjoyed as a welcome diversion from the monotony· of camp 
routine. One morning when I arrived at my office, I found Kimichan quietly 
crying and somber faces on the rest of the staff. On inquiry, the navy chief told 
me Kimichan's father had been sentenced to jail. He was a suijicho, and a few 
afternoons before, after the last meal had been cooked, several fish were 
73 
Saipan's Camp Susupe 
Kimichao. (Norman Meller) 
delivered to his dantai. Instead of having them boiled for use the following day, 
he decided to reward his kitchen crew, and directed that the fish be filleted and 
cut into small pieces suitable to be eaten as sashimi. He and some fifteen others 
then enjoyed the luxury of a snack of raw fish dipped in soy sauce. This diversion 
was soon reported to the camp police, who investigated, and Kimichan's father 
and the rest of the kitchen crew were ordered to appear in provost court. Not 
only did the judge "throw the book" at them by sentencing all to terms in jail, but 
he subjected Kimichan's father to a severe tongue lashing. For the sake of a few 
fish he had violated his trust as suijicho. Her father publicly disgraced, Kimichan 
could no longer hold her head high. Although she continued at her job in the 
records office, never again did I hear Kimichan singing as she worked. 
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Charlie Chaplin and Toscanini 
The first time I entered the Japanese area of Camp Susupe at night was shortly 
after I had arrived on Saipan, and I admit to having been apprehensive. After all, 
I was venturing alone into the midst of 13,500 enemy aliens. Once beyond the 
camp gate, and its single electric light bulb casting a halo over the Chamorro 
sentry on duty, I was engulfed in a darkness that cloaked with anonymity anyone 
I might encounter. Except for the yakuba, there was no electricity inside camp. 
No light from moon or stars illuminated the camp buildings or shone on the faces 
of the civilians. Over my left arm I had draped a folded poncho, concealing that 
my hand was holding a holster encasing a navy-issue, .45-caliber revolver. So 
provided with a sense of false courage, I walked through Area 3, as human 
figures quietly loomed up before me out of the darkness, only to quickly pass by 
and disappear. Parenthetically, I might add, never again did I enter the camp 
armed. 
Gradually, as my eyes became accustomed to the darkness, I was able to 
discern the outlines of the shik'sha I was passing. Occasionally, shining through a 
door frame or open shutter, I could see the flame of a candle burning, casting 
little light on the building's interior. Here and there on the ground, the flare ofa 
very small fire outside a shik'sha marked where some occupant was brewing tea. 
Camp rules that I had just recently perused prohibited lights or fires between 
sunset and sunrise unless authorized, and I concluded that either permission had 
been granted for these tiny flames, or, more likely, the prohibition was no longer 
being enforced. 
As I approached one of the few Japanese police outposts in the camp, and 
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passed into and out of the faint light of the gasoline lantern hung over it, the 
nodding policeman would start on seeing me and awkwardly salute. Most of the 
time the camp was silent, with the quiet occasionally broken by a child crying. 
Apparently most of the civilians were already asleep inside their quarters, and 
those awake were communicating only through whispers. What else was there to 
do, as the camp rules-again unless countermanded-prohibited singing, playing 
of instruments, or making any disturbing noise after 20:00 hours. After all,. the 
work crews, who got up early each morning, had to have their sleep. I came 
away from that initial visit with an impression of the camp, once the short twi" 
light of the tropics had completely faded, being smothered under a stifling black 
cover, with little its occupants could legally do to break the monotony of their 
life at night. 
The one exception to this nightly blackout routinely occurred semi-monthly, 
when the Labor Section scheduled its payday. At a large open space central.to 
Area 3, for a period of up to three hours, night became almost day as large ligpts 
powered by a temporary generator shone on the Labor Section's portable pay 
booth and lit up the surrounding area. Waiting workers lined. up in long rows,. 
snaking out from the booth, and gradually inched closer as those in line before 
them were paid. Once at the booth, and after having their names and identifying 
labor tags checked by the payroll personnel, they received envelopes containing 
in American money the amounts shown on the payroll as due them for work 
performed since the last payday. Receipt was acknowledged by placing a thumb-
print on the payroll record, guarding against an impostor receiving the wages of 
another civilian. 
Initially, I was told, there was only one pay line, and because of name 
confusion and disagreements over time credited, "payday" took an interminably 
long period to complete, stretching out close to midnight. By the time I arrived 
on Saipan, the whole process had been systematized, with separate treatment for 
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nonroutine matters speeding the flow. This, along with the tripling of the pay 
lines, had materially compressed the time necessary for completing the operation. 
However, it was not regarded by the internees as an unmixed blessing, for the 
pay period afforded an opportunity to socialize in the cool of the evening, to 
meet with friends, and attend to matters for which there was inadequate opportu-
nity during the workday. The bright lights also attracted groups of children from 
allover camp, who played with each other at the fringes of the crowd. So twice a 
month, in the nightly gloom and silence of Area 3, a little island of brightness and 
noisy gaiety mushroomed for a few hours, only to disappear once the generators 
were stopped, to again reappear the next payday some two weeks later. 
In contrast to the civilian camp on Tinian, within Area 3 of Camp Susupe I 
remember very little being organized to provide for the entertainment or recrea-
tion of civilians. On Tinian a troop of kabuki players periodically provided the 
civilian Japanese with performances of both traditional and modem plays. Occa-
sionally in Susupe there would be field days for both children and adults that 
included mass activities such as group calisthenics and athletic dancing. Relay 
races were favorites of the Japanese, as they maximized both involvement and 
team play. The opening of a recreation center in the camp provided the occasion 
for a series of sumo matches. An area adjoining the naval military government 
quarters on the shore had been set aside as·a Japanese civilian swimming beach. 
At least once a week all children of school age were marched there from Area 3 
under the watchful protection of their teachers. At prescribed times, adults, as 
well, had access to the beach for recreation, but only under limitations that 
assured continuance of their internment. A small temple located in the middle of 
the Japanese cemetery, with fittings donated by the Hongwanji Buddhist Society 
of Honolulu, served the spiritual needs of the Buddhists in camp. Under the guid-
ance of a Buddhist priest, appropriate ceremonies for births, marriages, and 
deaths were observed, and important religious holidays celebrated. 
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Although there was a small library in Susupe whose collection included 
some books printed in either Japanese or English and a few American magazines, 
it was obviously inadequate. The Office of War Information supplied the camp 
with copies of its Photo Review, printed in Japanese, but the internees treated it 
as wartime propaganda, which it clearly was. The Office of War Information 
occasionally also brought to camp copies of the Hawaii Times, a newspaper 
published in Hawai'i that covered world events, including news originating in 
Japan. The Mariana Hiho, produced by the Office of War Information, which 
carried Camp Susupe news as well as limited current events, was regularly dis-
tributed in camp. Since one of its functions was reputed to be serving as a propa,... 
ganda leaflet to be dropped on Japanese-occupied areas to establish that Japanese 
civilians. were being well taken care of on Saipan, this explains why the Hiho did 
not have an avid camp readership. Beyond these snippets, my memory of the 
recreational aspect of camp life remains a blank, probably stemming from the 
bureaucratic organization of the military government and its c.ongruent categori-
zation of duties, so that concern for this aspect did not fall within my regular 
sphere. In the absence of the yakuba taking the initiative to launch an effort to 
improve civilian morale in camp, and seeking to gain through me the military 
government commander's approval for such proposed action, I had enough to do 
without taking on this additional function. However, there was one exception, 
when by sponsoring camp movies, I did attempt to break the dreariness of camp 
life. 
It all started with the Office of War Information and was surprisingly linked. 
to Charlie Chaplin, not that the Office, in seeking to help win the war through 
influencing public opinion, would have been inherently adverse to using humor to 
that end. However, I am confident that it had no plans to bring a Charlie Chaplin 
film to display that night-or any night-to the internees of Camp Susupe. But 
unbeknownst to the Office of War Information, that is just what it did. 
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One evening sometime in the late spring, a crew from the Office of War 
Information rigged up a temporary screen in the Japanese area and after dark 
projected several short films concerned with American life. As I recall, the first of 
them had either a Japanese-language sound track or Japanese-language captions, 
but the others had neither, and relied entirely on English. The subject of the last 
film was an American symphony orchestra, shown playing before a large audi-
ence in the United States under the direction of the renowned conductor, Arturo 
Toscanini. Almost none of the internees who had gathered to view the films 
could read the English captions, and probably even fewer were familiar with 
classical western music or had witnessed it played by a full symphony orchestra. 
After the initial rustle of bewilderment among the internees as the first few 
scenes showed Toscanini raising his baton and directing the formally garbed 
orchestra members to begin, a surprised murmur of recognition swept through 
the crowd: "Charlie Chaplin!" The very appearance of Toscanini with his long 
white hair, the abrupt movements of his head accompanying the emotional 
empathy with the themes of the music so vividly displayed on his face, the exag-
gerated sweep of his arms as he cued the various members of the orchestra on 
when to play, only confirmed it. The nature of the music was entirely lost on the 
entranced onlookers. If the camera focused on cymbals being struck or a hom 
sounded in response to Toscanini's signal, it only served to reinforce the errone-
ous conclusion that a comedy was being performed, and sent the internees off 
into renewed gales oflaughter. They were mesmerized by what they took to be 
the antics of a world-famous comedian. Once the film ended, tremendous 
applause erupted. Not even the turning off of the temporary lights erected by the 
Office of War Information stilled the civilians' enthusiastic chatter as they made 
their way back to their shik'sha. 
The following morning, as I walked through camp to my office from my 
quarters on the beach, I was repeatedly stopped by internees inquiring whether it 
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would be possible to show another movie, frequently with the addition of refer-
ence to "Charlie Chaplin." I knew it would have been pointless to attempt to 
dissuade them from the mistaken identity, so while agreeing with them that "yes, 
indeed" the leader of the orchestra in the film was eimei (famous), I remained 
silent over the fact that it was because he was Toscanini the conductor and not 
Chaplin the comedian. Incidentally, I do not remember anyone inquiring about 
bringing another program of classical western music into camp. I could promise 
no further showing of Charlie Chaplin, but given the very positive boost demon-
strated to camp morale, I resolved that somehow I would have more movies 
shown at night in Camp Susupe, even though it was not part of my directed 
duties. It proved easier said than done. 
Bringing films into camp was a haphazard undertaking by the Office of War 
Information and not one of its routine activities. Nor was the occasional borrow-
ing by the naval military government of films happening to be on the island, 
which were then projected at the enlisted men's mess hall, but it did suggest an 
avenue by which films might be shown to the civilians in camp. The temporary 
use of a portable generator could be arranged, as could be access to a 16-mm 
film projector, ifthe requests were made sufficiently in advance to obtain the 
necessary approval. The erection of a makeshift screen presented no insurmount-
able difficulty, just so long as it was removed reasonably soon after the showing. 
To do otherwise would have presented too great a temptation for some young-
ster in camp desiring to demonstrate his skill by throwing rocks at the unsullied 
target. The real difficulty lay in securing information on the availability of films, 
and this sufficiently in advance to allow all of the preliminary arrangements to be 
made. 
As I recall, the showing of a western provided the first test, and it was an 
overwhelming success. Even though the civilians in Area 3 could not understand 
the English dialogue, the action in the film, with its exaggerated portrayal of 
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good and evil, pretty well spoke for itself. It is not improbable that in prewar 
days the internees had already been introduced to this Hollywood genre, although 
undoubtedly embellished with suitable Japanese subtitles. Drawing large atten-
dance, other films followed, mostly at irregular intervals, despite my goal of one 
showing a week. 
Sometimes the projection of a film had to be delayed until long after dark 
because the one being borrowed was first shown at some military installation on 
the island and then rushed to camp. Meanwhile an expectant crowd would gather 
and wait, more tolerant of the delay than an American audience would be. 
Possibly through the dantaicho, the yakuba had explained how the nature of the 
jerry-built system for obtaining the films caused the delays. The apogee was 
reached one evening when the enlisted man of the naval military government 
responsible for bringing the film to camp arrived late in a flurried state. He had 
waited to receive the arranged-for film, only to be told it could not be borrowed. 
Desperate, he had obtained another film. All that he knew about the substitute 
was that it was an unrestricted army training film. The hour was late, the assem-
bled crowd beginning to grow restless, so without any knowledge of its contents, 
the projectionist inserted the first reel in the projector. 
For what to me seemed an interminable period, the gathered civilians of 
Area 3 were then introduced to the intricacies of how to operate an army road 
grader and with it prepare a roadbed for paving. Some of the film had been taken 
from the perspective ofthe driver, other parts from that of a viewer standing 
ahead or on the side of the road. Yard after yard and then foot after foot of the 
whole surface was scraped and piled into long neat rows of dirt parallel to the 
roadway, only for the whole to be redistributed over the surface, and the same 
process repeated over and over again. 
As soon as I became aware of the absurdity of showing the film in camp and 
was about to order that the projector be stopped, I noticed that the assembled 
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crowd was patiently watching the whole boring thing as though some mystery 
were to be revealed once that tom-up road was ultimately smoothed out and the 
last bit of soil redistributed. So I, too, waited until the end of the first reel, when 
the surface of the road was finally in place, and ended the show. I never did find 
out what the Japanese civilians in camp thought the film was all about. 
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Sensei, Is There a Special Medicine? 
By early 1945, Camp Susupe's medical and public health problems were well 
under control. From what I was told by some of the military government old-
timers, and confirmed subsequently through reading official naval reports, this 
was a far cry from the situation immediately after the air and sea bombardment 
softened up the island for the American invasion. From D day, combat medical 
personnel tried to tend civilians along with the military casualties. Not until four 
days later did the first doctor attached to the naval military government, accom-
panied by two corpsmen, get ashore, and in less than an hour they had used up 
their supplies. The combat medical personnel during those early days of the 
fighting also ran out of the medical supplies they had brought, and only through 
locating Japanese medical stocks and using them for both troops and civilians 
were they able to avert catastrophe. Crucial supplies such as sulpha powder for 
wounds, tetanus antitoxins, medicine for dysentery, plaster of paris, and even 
soap for a while remained in short supply. 
On 26 June, just eleven days after D day, a unit of the Army 31st Field 
Hospital set up a ISO-bed, tent-type civilian hospital adjoining Camp Susupe to 
tend the 1,200 civilians needing hospitalization. To supplement the combat 
medical personnel, trained civiliims were put to work as doctors, nurses, nurse's 
aides, and midwives, a practice continued by the naval military government as its 
medical complement assumed care of the civilians in camp. With the camp taking 
shape, the naval military government erected dispensaries in each of the three 
areas, and to the Japanese dispensaries assigned both American naval and Japa-
nese civilian doctors, plus a large complement of civilian nurse's aides. A month 
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after D day, an average of 1,100 people were reporting daily to the dispensaries 
for treatment. 
The civilian mortality rate was gruesome, with some two thousand known 
deaths tallied in the first three months after D day, almost nineteen hundred of 
them Japanese. Diarrhea, dysentery, and malnutrition are listed as the principal 
causes of death, but wounds and their attendant infections must also have been 
major contributors. For October, the fourth month, infants and childfen 
accounted for over half of the total deaths reported. From then on, the civ.ilian 
mortality rate dropped and continued to fall materially. 
'Once the 369th Station Hospital was erected elsewhere on the island, civilian 
patients were transferred to it from the army field hospital. Later they were 
moved into a civilian annex of the Station Hospital overlooking Magicienne Bay, 
miles away from Camp Susupe. (The distance was to assume a new significance 
,months later, when I rode out of camp at the head of a truck caravan of civilians 
benton wrecking the buildings and salvaging their luniber~hut this is getting 
ahead of my story.) When a spanking new, five-hundred-bed Quonset naval 
hospital opened at the edge of Camp Susupe around the time I arrived on Sa~pan, 
once again all CiVilians were hospitalized adjoining the camp. The hospital staffof 
14 officers and 186 enlisted men materially expanded the size of the naval mili-
tary government unit. By the end of the war, the hospital was providing most of 
the medical care required by civilians in camp, with the remaining two dispensa-
ries attending to only minor matters. 
The civilian attitude toward medical personnel in the naval military govern-
ment was generally favorable because of their contribution to the dramatic 
change in camp following the trauma of the bombardment and their sympathetic 
treatment of the internees. The ambivalence they occasionally encountered could 
be attributed to other factors. Civilian women were reluctant to be physically 
examined by navy corpsmen and adamantly opposed to their presence during 
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childbirth. I was told that because of this navy nurses were added to the hospital 
staff. Another source of negativism in doctor-patient relationships arose from the 
civilians' need to obtain a doctor's medical excuse in order to absent themselves 
from work. 
Daunting as was the medical situation initially confronting the naval military 
government, the magnitude of the public health problem was at least as challeng-
ing. The medical officer in charge was responsible for burial of the dead, mainte-
nance of camp sanitation, garbage and waste disposal, and ridding the internees 
and living quarters of body lice. Despite spraying from airplanes and by joint 
crews of enlisted men and internees, swarms of flies and mosquitoes persisted. 
Continued vigilance was necessary to maintain the cleanliness of the suijiba and 
assure their staff's observance of the practices designed to prevent food poison-
ing. To discourage the breeding of mosquitoes, internees were required to keep 
the lids tightly secured on top of the barrels in which they caught rainwater from 
the roofs of their dwellings. Dantaicho (heads of sections) had to be reminded of 
their responsibility for keeping their dantai free of litter and reprimanded when 
they failed to do so. By early 1945, a complex, many-faceted system of public 
health and sanitation had evolved and was being methodically followed, best 
evidenced by the common sight of crews of a corpsman and his civilian assistants 
on their daily rounds as "fly details." 
Sited on what was once agricultural land, Camp Susupe was soon overrun by 
field mice. (I had reason to learn that the mouse population was excessive after 
my very first night on Saipan: the following morning while dressing in my tent I 
found that a litter of tiny blind mice had been born in one of the shoes I had left 
under my cot while I slept.) Reducing the mice population was a persistent prob-
lem. Given the cramped quarters of the internees and the omnipresence oflittle 
children, widespread distribution of poisoned bait was too dangerous an option. 
Skeptics in the naval military government questioned the internees' complaints of 
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food inadequacy. To them, the continuing mice problem only demonstrated that 
surplus food was entering camp, that the internees were wasting it, and so the 
mice fed on it and multiplied. 
Someone in the internal Japanese administration proposed an innovative way 
to gain control over the mice population. The trade store had acquired a supply 
of tropical chocolate candy after it had become discolored in storage and, as well, 
insects had begun boring into some of the pieces. Rejected by the GIs .. the candy 
had been declared military surplus. Why not reward the children in camp with a 
piece of this chocolate for each mouse caught and delivered to the dantaicho? 
For the children, probably encouraged by their families, the mice-catching scheme 
would offer a welcome opportunity to sweeten the camp diet at no expense. 
Judged by the reports periodically issued of mouse carcasses turned in, the 
scheme appeared to be working exceedingly well. Although the children fash-
ioned simple traps, so effective were they-or perhaps, so numerous was the 
rodent population-that soon the yakuba was being asked for what seemed 
excessive amounts of candy as rewards. As with most supply-and-demand rela-
tionships, the number of mice to be brought in for a candy reward was then 
doubled, and ultimately tripled. Then it was discovered that during the night, 
garbage cans holding discarded carcasses were being surreptitiously raided,and 
the following day the same mice were being submitted again. Clipping the ears 
when new carcasses were surrendered stopped the double counting. Ultimately, 
when it was no longer a game, the children lost interest in catching mice. As the 
number of mice in camp dwindled, what once was play became a chore.More-
over, the candy was neither particularly sweet nor palatable because it contained 
wax that prevented melting. 
Shortly after I assumed my duties in camp, hundreds of children appeared 
with purple swatches scattered over their bodies. Scabies were running amok in 
camp, and seriatim, dantai by dantai, all children were examined by the medical 
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personnel, and the colorful specific for this contagious disease-gentian violet-
was liberally swabbed on all infected skin areas discovered. Children whose 
scabies were not cured by the initial attempt had to endure a follow-up examina-
tion and repeat treatment. Once the epidemic was under control, the sporadic 
appearance of the tell-tale color on the shaven head or limb of some hapless child 
showed that the disease had not been completely eradicated. 
Intestinal parasites were another affliction endemic to the camp and suffered 
by almost all internees. Once the more pressing medical needs of individuals were 
attended to, and sanitation measures es~ablished so that maintenance of public 
health became a matter of routine observance, the medical personnel were able to 
tum their attention to preventive inoculations against infectious diseases and the 
eradication of body worms. To be effective, deworming required a major 
endeavor, far more than merely prescribing a dose of medicine. First, a public 
information program had to be mounted to acquaint the internees with the 
etiology of the disease and the necessity of defecating only in the camp's open-pit 
latrines. Ideally no one should walk barefoot, for wearing shoes or zori (thong 
sandals) would prevent contact with worm eggs on the ground. Because some in 
camp possessed neither, the areas around each benjo would have to be inspected 
frequently and kept sanitized. Finally, a complete regime of repeated ministra-
tions of the deworming medicine must be observed to assure its efficacy, which 
necessitated lining up all of the internees and insisting that they each take the 
dosage prescribed over the allotted period. With much advance planning, and 
close cooperation between the camp administration, the internal Japanese police, 
and the naval government medical personnel, the eradication program was 
launched. 
Given that the mass effort would ultimately affect thousands of people in the 
most intimate of ways, there had to be some rapid means for assuring that the 
medicine prescribed was at least generally effective in purging the interned 
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Children rescued by the US Marine Corps on Saipan. (US Navy) 
civilians of their worms. To a hapless team of workers in the sanitation detail fell 
this noxious task. Once the deworming was under way, for the. next few days 
they removed stool samples from the pit latrines and examined them .for worms. 
In some cases this meant that the sanitation workers, after removing the latrine 
covers, would have to climb part way down into the pit, guarding themselves 
against falling into the smelly debris below. Inspection furnished ample proof that 
the project was proceeding satisfactorily. 
Beside operating the civilian hospital and dispensaries in Camp Susupe, the 
medical personnel of the naval military government were responsible for two 
other distinctive institutions. One of these, the orphanage, was the apple of the 
chief medical officer's eye. Shortly after D day, the military government had 
found itself inundated with hundreds of orphan children, many infants, some as 
young as four months old. Given their many medical problems and emaciated 
physical condition, it was logical that oversight of orphans be assigned to the 
medical personnel. I was told that an emergency request for diapers, baby bottles, 
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Children in the dining room of the Japanese orphanage on Saipan. (US Navy) 
and nipples was the initial message the medical supply officer dispatched back to 
Honolulu. Women volunteers from camp were sought to care for the orphans. 
The naval military government hastily built a crude shelter to house them and 
equipped it with its own kitchen, the first structure to be erected. From these 
early beginnings emerged a model orphanage dedicated in the Japanese area 
during my tour on Saipan, four commodious Quonset huts radiating outward like 
spikes from a central building, the whole fenced off from the rest of the camp 
with its own play area for the children. 
During the months since D day, it had been possible to place the Chamorro 
and Carolinian children with distant relatives, or to encourage their adoption into 
island families. The same was true for the Korean children in Area 2, so that only 
a residual group of eighty or so Japanese orphans remained. Meanwhile the 
civilian personnel of the orphanage were replaced, after it was learned that the 
Japanese women who had volunteered their services had been prostitutes on 
Saipan before the war. Despite their very dedicated performance in attending to 
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the orphans, the military government accepted the suggestion from a civilian 
committee in camp that it would be best for the children if "better educated, more 
respectable ladies" cared for them. The high standards set for adoption of the 
Japanese children tended to discourage family placement, so that the orphanage 
gradually changed from a temporary shelter to an institution, with perpetuation 
becoming an end in itself The Japanese in camp contributed to this process by 
dedicating funds for the orphans when raising money forthe welfare needs of 
Susupe. Whenever I visited the orphanage, I would be immediately surrounded 
by a group of neatly dressed, healthy appearing, laughing children ;hangingonto 
me, visuai evidence of what good medical treatment, a weii..,balanced ,diet, ade-
quate living accommodations, and caring attention could achieve even under the 
adverse conditions of life in Camp Susupe. 
The other separate institution within the responsibility of the militarygov-
.ernment medical unit was the leprosarium. It moved into new quarters while 
I was on Saipan, two small, neat buildings that I recall as being painted white, 
probably because of the sharp contrast of their appearance with the unpainted 
shik'sha, with their nondescript surfaces of scrounged materials. Physically apart 
from the hospital, the leprosarium was administered somewhat as a medical 
annex, with corpsmen daily bringing food, and doctors making periodic rounds. 
Ignoring the more humane policy then becoming accepted, of referring to this 
age-old scourge as Hansen's disease, the navy chose to continue to call those 
suffering from the disease lepers. The social ostracism that immediately engulfed 
anyone so labeled was of no concern to the navy. Ironically, the reference to the 
disease as leprosy had an unexpected positive aspect. A large, prominent sign 
reading "Leprosarium, Keep Out," erected at the gate leading into the grounds 
was a warning sufficient to frighten off even the most adventuresome GIs. It kept 
the area safe from their night-time forays, even though the leprosarium was 
outside the patrolled, barbed-wire limits of Camp Susupe. 
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At this time, elsewhere in the world chaulmoogra oil was being used incon-
clusively against the microbe Mycobacterium leprae, responsible for causing the 
disease, and treatment with antibiotics was not yet well established. The medical 
personnel on Saipan believed that placing the patients in well-aired, separate 
facilities, providing them with nourishing food, and, to guard against secondary 
infection, treating any leprous lesion that might develop was the optimum care 
that could be provided. Such isolation also prevented the disease from spreading 
to others in camp through contact. 
Several civilians had already been committed by the naval government doc-
tors and were living in the leprosarium when I received a telephone call at my 
office. Two internees had just been diagnosed as having leprosy and the follow-
ing morning were to be removed from the Japanese area to the leprosarium. 
There might be difficulties, and I was asked to be present to assist as interpreter, 
if necessary. 
Early the next day I walked over to the Japanese dispensary inside Area 3 and 
found waiting the chief medical officer, the hospital ambulance with its driver, 
and two Japanese women. I judged one of the civilians to be about forty-five 
years old, the other half her age. The elder was small, dumpy, and undistin-
guished. The younger, while not a beauty, was taller, slimmer, and comely. Both 
had long hair tied in a bun at the back of the head, and wore the nondescript garb 
of the camp, an amalgam of altered clothing that owed its origins to Red Cross 
distribution and cloth purchased from the trade store. Each had at her feet a 
pitifully small bundle, tied with aJuroshiki (square Japanese cloth used for 
wrapping bundles), that contained all of her worldly possessions. Neither had any 
visible skin eruptions or blemishes, nor did their faces display any hint of the 
leonine features associated with the later stages ofleprosy. The doctors must 
have discovered areas of their bodies insensitive to pain on examination, as when 
being pricked by a pin, the sign of nerve impairment that first heralds the 
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onslaught of more destructive body changes to follow. 
On questioning by the chief medical officer, both women briefly responded 
that they had been told they had raibyo (leprosy). Yes, they understood that they 
would have to leave where they were living in camp and go to the leprosarium. 
They were.ready and had brought their possessions with them. Neither showed 
. any emotion or made any sign of resistance. They just waited to· be told what to 
do next. The .chief medical officer commented that we had bettergetgoing.and 
suggested that as it was such a nice day, we all four walkovertotheleprosar-
ium. It would take less than half an hour and offer an opportunity forhimtotalk 
to me about a number of public heaith probiems incamprequir:ing:attention. The 
Juroshiki-"wrapped bundles could be loaded into the ambulance and taken overby 
the driver. And so our little group started off 
It was truly one of those rather rare days on Saipan when the weather was 
cool and crisp, the sun not yet so hot as to debilitate. It was.pleasantwalking 
over, and soon the doctor and I were engrossed in discussing the matters he was 
raising. Behind us silently trailed the two women, the younger in the rear. Occa-
sionally as I walked I would glance back, and noticed that the distance between 
the two was gradually widening, with the younger falling farther back, while the 
elder trudged dutifully on. I could well imagine the thoughts tumbling through 
the younger woman's mind. With each step she was leaving the world she knew 
and coming closer to a horrible future. This was the last time she would be in 
camp, see children playing, be free to visit with her friends. Once she entered the 
gate to the leprosarium she would become part of the living dead. But still her 
face showed no emotion, nor did she utter any sound that might reveal her 
feelings. All that could be heard was the sound of the women's zori rhythmically 
slapping on the ground as they walked behind us. 
Suddenly the pace of the footsteps quickened, and I immediately jumped to 
the conclusion that the women were running away. I was wrong. The younger 
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woman was running toward us. As she came close, a beseeching half-smile on her 
face, she timidly pulled at my shirtsleeve and asked, "Sensei [honored person] is 
there a special medicine in America for me?" Howl hated having to translate her 
question into English for the chief medical officer and in tum translate for her his 
anticipated negative reply. 
93 
9 
Economics, and the Labor Shibai 
As soon as it was possible to introduce a degree of organized routine into the 
initial chaos of camp life, practically all internees capable of doing anything useful 
were put to work. The dead had to be buried, the sick and wounded cared for, 
food gathered to supplement the minimal military supplies available, and tempo-
rary shelters erected. At first this meant that civilians were assigned to whatever 
undertakings had the highest priorities to relieve suffering in camp. All were 
treated as ungraded laborers, regardless of their education and individual skills. 
By the end of the first month, with screening identifying the capabilities of adult 
internees, they could be reassigned to more permanent labor details appropriate 
to their individual capacities. However, the bulk of the civilians remained in 
Susupe's unskilled labor pool, allocated, regardless of classification, to work 
both inside and outside the camp. Once Saipan was declared secure, the naval 
military government found itself hard put to simultaneously meet the near insatia-
ble demands from the military units on the island for civilian labor and to provide 
the internal services necessary to keep Camp Susupe functioning. There was 
always need for stevedores, ditch diggers, cleaners, laundresses, seamstresses, 
nurse's aides, and carpenters, to name a few of the categories established by the 
Labor Office. 
To the naval military government, putting civilians to work had a far more 
important purpose than merely providing cheap labor to help accomplish short-
term military objectives. It was considered fundamental that internees be kept 
busy, to the end of building morale and encouraging their rehabilitation. Lest this 
be dismissed offhand as a transparent rationalization, even more significantly the 
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military government regarded such work as essential to building a self-sufficient 
island economy to replace what had been totally destroyed by the war. While 
there was no plan to raise the standard ofliving above the prewar level, ulti-
mately the military occupation's participation in the island economy was to be 
minimized, and private enterprise would take over, presumably under some form 
of continuing American rule. Meanwhile it was to the American national interest 
that the civilians be as self-supporting as possible. Civilian labor constituted but 
one aspect of the military government's many economic interests, but it was 
pivotal because of its influence on all others. 
Officially, all labor performed by interned civilians was voluntary. The first 
order issued for the island, Saipan General Order No.1, declared, "All able 
bodied adult persons (except women with minor children) may volunteer to work 
for compensation, but the services of all male adults will be considered as subject 
to requisition under the principles of international law." In fact, those principles 
are extremely vague. The Hague Convention of 1907 merely provided that 
"enemy nationals could not be forced to work on military projects except on a 
purely voluntary basis for pay but could be hired or requisitioned with pay to 
work on non-military projects." The naval military government prided itself that 
no requisitioning of civilian labor ever occurred in Camp Susupe, but this primar-
ily encompassed never having had recourse to the technical formalities of requisi-
tioning. It ignored the realities of life in camp, just as the language of the Island 
Order never precluded women with minor children from working, nor boys as 
young as fourteen years of age. Rather, when registering in camp all civilians 
went through the charade of signing labor contracts offering their services "freely 
and voluntarily without force or coercion or the threat thereof" As pay for their 
labor they received the monetary remuneration fixed by the Economics Depart-
ment and, in addition, were provided with food, shelter, health care, and physical 
protection. 
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While in the early days of Camp Susupe the civilians had been told that their 
work was voluntary, this had become something of a shibai (facade, playacting), 
as evidenced by camp requirements that every registered worker must receive an 
authorization to be absent from assigned work. Normally this consisted of a 
medical excuse or special dispensation, such as for illness or death in the family. 
Unmentioned was the workers' loss of the food differential should they fail to 
tum out, and always residual was the unspoken apprehension of what else might 
happen to them should they challenge the labor system. In contrast, the civilian 
internment camp on Tinian employed the positive sanction of allotting bonus 
purchases at the trade store to those who worked an uninterrupted full month. 
Night-time employment was particularly unpopular. In April 1945, seven-
teen men in the Japanese area who protested such work were charged with 
participating in an unlawful demonstration and each sentenced to thirty days' 
confinement at hard labor. The women in camp were more successful when 
registering their objections to night-time work. Initially three crews of civilian 
women had been assigned round-the-clock to meet the labor demands of the 
giant military laundry built close to the camp. After they failed to show up at 
midnight despite the importuning of their foremen, the "graveyard" shift from 
midnight to 08:00 was eliminated. The two other shifts continued, with women 
from the Japanese area constituting the bulk of the laundry labor force. 
Soon after my arrival in Camp Susupe, I detected an undercurrent of resent-
ment among the Japanese internees over this "voluntary" work. Reports of 
"soldiering on the job" filtering in to the military government from outside work 
assignments reflected the adverse influence of this attitude in their lack of dedica-
tion to their tasks. Later I was to participate in a labor project initiated in the 
Japanese area that was completely devoid of any sanction, and both the blithe 
spirit in which the civilian men joined in the undertaking and the quality of its 
outcome provided me with positive evidence of the difference and virtue of true 
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voluntarism. 
The Economics Department calculated prewar Japanese wages in terms of 
the Japanese yen's purchasing power and, after making deductions for food and 
shelter, used this as the basis for setting Susupe's pay scale. Rates were fixed at 
35 cents a day for unskilled male labor, 50 cents for skilled~ similarly females 
earned 20 or 35 cents a day. Orderlies, mess boys, and personal servants received 
the lower rate of25 cents a day. The men occupying the highest post in each of 
the camp's three areas at first were paid the sum of $20 a month, and in mid-
December it was raised to $30 a month. Initially civilians worked without any day 
off~ later the work week stabilized at six days, with Sunday the day of rest. Simi .. 
larly, the work period was reduced to eight hours, excluding time required for 
transportation to and from work, and for meals. For the normal work day, exter-
nallaborers were picked up at the labor gate at a time fixed between 07:00 and 
08:00, and with the shortened work period, were to be returned to camp no later 
than 17:00. For some of the internal workers in camp the work day started much 
earlier, as for the suijiba crews charged with the duty oflighting the cooking fires 
and preparing food for the workers' morning meal before they left camp. 
The Labor Office's records showed fully three-fourths of the employed men 
as being engaged in unskilled labor, but only two-fifths of the working women. 
While this might indicate either that there was a lesser need for unskilled female 
labor or that a larger proportion of Japanese women than men were skilled, it 
could be attributed to a lower wage rate having been set for women, requiring 
them to be classed as skilled in order to earn 35 cents a day. The largest compo-
nent of women workers in Susupe was employed as members of the suijiba 
crews, about half as large a cohort served as nurses and nurse's aides in the camp 
hospital, and a corresponding number worked externally in the military laundry. 
In October 1944, less than four months after D day, of the near four thou-
sand civilians registered in the central labor pool, half were employed outside the 
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camp, another third in camp, and private entrepreneurs and laborers-the last 
primarily civilians residing with their employers, mostly farmers-made up the 
balance. Antifraternization rules applied to work outside camp, and no cigarettes, 
candy, or food was to be given to civilian workers other than the noontime meal 
or ration. Conversation with civilians was to be restricted to essentials, and mili-
tary personnel guarding them were directed to withdraw from their presence 
during the civilians' rest periods. Over time these work strictures were gradually 
relaxed, but though it is improbable that any GI ever suffered disciplinary action 
for failing to observe them, not so the unlucky civilians caught entering camp 
after work with anything incriminating on their person. For example, in May 
1945 a man was sentenced to serve twenty days at hard labor and ordered to pay 
a fine of $10 for unlawfully fraternizing, "to wit: purchase a carton of cigarettes 
for one dollar from a member of the Armed Forces at his place of employment, 
Signal Dept." 
Susupe's entire economy was structured around the military government's 
initial decision to fix pay scales for all civilians at a low rate pegged to the dis-
counted prewar yen. Should the military government thereafter have sought to 
end the established system of free food distribution in the camp, and require the 
civilians to pay for their meals, as by privatizing the preparation and distribution 
of food, the pay scale would have had to be raised to implement the change. In 
tum this would have had an immediate impact on the schedule of prices that 
entrepreneurs were permitted to charge, for to ensure equity the Economics 
Department had established them at a rate that would "place the independent 
laborer and wage earner on a comparative basis." Similarly, the earnings of civil-
ians in the farm cooperatives would be affected, for the return they received for 
the produce they grew was tied to the same wage scales. A further reason for not 
making any such major change in food policy was that it would have required 
launching a massive program of welfare subventions, for many civilians were not 
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gainfully employed so could not pay for the food they consumed. In Area 3, 
nearly half ofthe 13,500 Japanese internees were children under the age of 
siXteen, with a goodly proportion of them not living with parents or close rela-
tives. Given all of these factors, it was better for the naval military government to 
avoid major economic change such as adopting a new basis for computing pay 
scales. To help meet camp costs the Economics Department looked to other 
means for diverting the income earned by internees. 
For four months after D day, with nothing available in' war-devastated· 
Saipan f()r which internees could legally spend their earnings~ the military govern:-
ment withheld payment of their wages. Meanwhile, it established: trade stores 
staffed by civilians, and arranged for them to be stocked with the type· of goods 
normally available in navy ships' stores, supplemented by merchandise ordered'to 
be shipped to Saipan to meet the special needs of the intemees~ The opening of 
the. trade stores in October reportedly had an immediate effect on camp morale, 
adding an entirely new dimension to the significance of work, and' contributing-to 
increased labor turnout. Initially the greatest civilian demand' was for cloth and 
sewing equipment, soap, and cigarettes, in that order of preference. Rationing, in 
the form of a monetary maximum that one person could spend helped, to spread 
the limited supplies available. Soon sales were running from $5,000 to $6,000 a 
week. The range of goods offered continued to expand as navy ships brought in 
additional merchandise, but sought-after goods did not remain long on the store 
shelves and always remained a problem due to the uncertainties of shipping 
schedules and supplies running out. The naval military government both charged 
the trade stores for the merchandise brought to Saipan and had to approve the 
retail prices at which they were resold. 
Within six months of their founding, the trade stores in all three areas of the 
camp were reorganized as cooperatives, the largest store in the Japanese area 
capitalized at $20,000, and the others at much smaller amounts. In each area, no 
100 
Economics and the Labor Shibai 
civilian could subscribe for more than ten shares of the cooperative at $10 a 
share, nor receive more than a 10 percent yearly return on the investment. As it is 
estimated that civilians in Camp Susupe earned over $300,000 during the first 
fourteen months, the trade stores were assured of a steady clientele. Indeed, one 
of the officers in the military government proposed that an income tax be levied, 
justifying it on the basis that enemy aliens should not be making a profit, but it 
came to naught. 
Part of the capital necessary to finance the cooperatives came from the 
American dollars the civilians received on the conversion of yen they had in their 
possession when coming into camp. The military government had found that 
civilians were trading their yen for any items they could procure from the GIs, so 
to end the practice it ordered the surrender of all Japanese money. Initially a 
maximum redemption of$25.00 (500 yen) per person was permitted, and a 
receipt given for any unredeemed difference. Later in October, more than 
$30,000 was additionally distributed for the unredeemed balance, but some yen 
remained undeclared. In February 1945, the military government declared all 
such unredeemed yen to be confiscated, so that technically any Japanese money 
still in the hands of the internees was now useless. However, for the civilians still 
concealing yen, doubtless in anticipation of a Japanese victory in the war, they 
still retained their prewar value. It is unknown whether this contributed to the 
cleavage among civilians in Area 3 after the emperor announced the end of the 
war, when some refused to accept the authenticity of the declaration. 
From October 1944, when the trade stores opened, the number of qualified 
civilians registered in camp as available for work expanded over 50 percent. This 
increase was overshadowed. by the number of independent entrepreneurs among 
them who by the war's end had increased almost 300 percent. Superficially, these 
data demonstrated the success of the naval military government's policy of 
encouraging private enterprise. Actually, the figures concealed the fact that now 
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counted as entrepreneurs were civilians who had been previously paid on a piece-
work basis but counted as employees. Before and after the change, the Eco-
nomics Department supervised the locally managed businesses, fixed employment 
standards and prices, and continued to be both the source of most of the raw 
materials used and the purchaser of most of the services or goods produced. 
In the early days of the camp, when in dire need of clothing for the intern-
ees, the military government hired platoons of women to use commandeered 
sewing machines. They were to alter parts of salvaged Japanese uniforms to 
make. them. suitable for civilian use and to fashion clothes and towels out of other 
salvaged war materials. With skilled hands these seamstresses also altered. 
women's dresses donated and sent to the camp from Honolulu by the Red Cross. 
Later, when the trade store began stocking bolts of cloth,. these same. seam,. 
stresses dispersed throughout the camp as entrepreneurs. Responding to a wide 
array of orders, they made dresses cut to a simple design; more elaborate wed-
ding gowns, shrouds for the dead, and many other items. Also, it was not long 
before nearly all males in Area 3, from tiny tykes to the aged, were sporting high-
crowned hats with abbreviated visors, sewn in camp out of salvaged canvas and 
resembling those worn by the Japanese military. Given the identical hats worn by 
the males and the similarity of the women's dresses,a number even cut from 
identical bolts of cloth, the camp began to assume a degree of smartness that 
contrasted markedly with its nondescript appearance in the very early period 
when internees wore the tatters of whatever clothing they had on when first 
taking to the hills. 
Barbers in all three ,areas of camp, a watch repairer in the Japanese area, and 
a cobbler and a masseur in Charan Kanoa were established as privately owned 
enterprises, charging prices fixed by the Economics Department, with all profits 
earned going to the proprietors. Besides these private businesses, the naval mili-
tary government set up a number of camp enterprises, paid the managers wages, 
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and turned their products over to the Economics Department for use in camp. 
Into this category fell the sewing machine and bicycle repair shops, and the black-
smith, cabinetmaker, sign painter, and bamboo rake and clothespin maker. They 
were physically arranged in a double row of shops known as the Ginza, an eco-
nomic area just outside the main gate of the Japanese area. Probably most imme-
diately affecting the internees-one internally and the other externally-were the 
bakery and the soap manufacturing enterprises. To the extent that requisite raw 
materials could be obtained through the Supply Department, there appeared to be 
no limit in camp to demand for their products. Within six months after D day, 
these two enterprises were turning out some three thousand loaves of bread, and 
over twelve hundred bars of soap each week. Rationing assured wide distribution 
of both within camp. As I remember them, both bread and soap were excellent, 
but diminutive in size, which probably was an element contributing to the demand 
for them remaining high. 
Once the civilians began to be gathered in Camp Susupe, and shortly after 
the island was declared secured, a thriving market was found among the GIs for 
island handicraft. By July the necessary materials had been gathered, and soon 
pandanus mats, coasters, cigarette cases, purses, and decorated fans were being 
woven by Islanders. Wristwatch straps and ties were produced on small looms, 
and shells and seeds strung into necklaces. Production began on model outrigger 
canoes assembled out of the same woods from which their prototypes were built. 
Carolinian "monkey god" figures were carved out of eftl, a very dense, heavy 
wood found on Saipan. Shortly, Japanese workers in Area 3 began producing 
some of these handicraft typical of the Pacific Islands, supplementing them with 
Japanese-style products. Dolls dressed in Japanese kimono of salvaged traditional 
cloth, oriental lanterns, bamboo cut and curved into innumerable useful shapes, 
even Japanese paintings on salvaged parachute silk and samples of Japanese 
calligraphy all found ready sale among the GIs. 
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At first the handicraft workers were all camp employees, paid on a piece-
work basis, but by November they were organized into formal cooperatives to 
encourage maximum production. However, they still remained under the watch-
ful eye of the Economics Department. Approximately a year after D day, some 
one hundred Islanders in Charan Kanoa and a much larger number of Japanese in 
Area 3 were busily engaged in a thriving handicraft business. Where once at the 
height of battle on Saipan the American GIs were hell-benton smashing anything 
that suggested a Japanese origin, now they were almost as vigorously competing 
among themselves for the limited opportunity to acquire and bring back to the 
United States some sampie of Japanese handicraft as mementos of their time on 
Saipan. 
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A large open area in a far comer of Cam'p Susupe had been set aside for building 
the Japanese area's new ku. I never learned why the designation ku was selected 
rather than just continuing to use the term dan, as for the other administrative 
sections ofthe.camp. Traditionally a Japanese town or village is divided into ku 
( wards) and probably the designation was intended to differentiate this area from 
the rest of the camp, marking a new era of furnishing improved housing for 
Japanese internees. If so, the policy was short-lived. 
Three months after D day, 100,000 board feet oflumber destined for civilian 
housing arrived on Saipan, and the first internees to benefit were the Chamorros 
and Carolinians. In addition to rehabilitating some of the old, Japanese-built 
structures in Charan Kanoa damaged during the fighting, wooden duplexes were 
erected there, and by mid-November the indigenous Islanders had moved into 
more commodious accommodations, settling in according to family ties and 
preinvasion patterns. The Korean internees were next to receive new quarters, 
and for them long, low, one-room-wide, barracks-type buildings were construc-
ted. To each of the 20-by-15-feet adjoining rooms were assigned eight to ten 
Korean civilians. Further housing effort then slowed, with only enough lumber 
remaining to erect what became the New Ku-despite the original intent that it 
would be the first of many. Ultimately, the dramatic ending of the war counter-
indicated consideration of any further effort to replace the camp's ramshackle 
shik'sha. 
The plans for the New Ku ambitiously proposed more covered shelter, as 
well as open space, per Japanese civilian than was available in the older portion 
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of the camp. The low, spare buildings were to follow the model of those in the 
Korean area, except that some would be only 150 feet by 20 feet and. others 
twice as long. About fifteen Japanese would be assigned tC!l each room; a greater 
density than in the Korean area. The buildings would be strung like a necklace. 
8I?ound the four sides of a sizable, open quadrangle, with the door and wooden 
shutter for the unglazed window of each room opening 011t0 the' central. court. In 
additi:on to the wells and cemented public bathing and washing: aprons. surround-
ing the buildings within the quadrangle, the roofs of four elevated: toilet struc-
tures would loom prominently over everything, replacing the many od0rifeF0us 
open-pit benjo found in the rest of the camp. Miracle· of mit\ades to, a. camp' 
devoid of the comfort of protective screening against flies and other insects, the 
windows of the toilet structures would be covered with wire mesh. The new-style 
toilets would empty into septic tanks dug beyond the end of the ku. A suijiba 
built along conventional lines would complete the normal complement for such 
an administrative section, but the Japanese civilians desired, and through their 
own efforts obtained, more. 
As the dimensions of the New Ku gradually took shape, the officials of the 
yakuba contacted me and proposed that separate cooking sheds be permitted, so 
that the occupants of each room could have the ability to prepare their own 
meals. I knew that to a certain extent this was already going on in camp at make-
shift fireplaces, frequently in the form of reheating suijiba-distributed food, and 
brewing coffee and tea. I dutifully communicated the request up the chain of 
command. It received the anticipated cold-water response: there were insufficient 
building supplies, cooking sheds would present a fire hazard, and if all internees 
were to be free to build their own facility, the resultant cacophony of sheds 
would destroy the architectural symmetry of the proposed ku. Undaunted, the 
yakuba then enlisted the services of the Japanese draftsmen employed by the 
Public Works Section, and soon presented sketches and blueprints for uniform 
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cooking sheds to be erected equidistantly and away from the buildings, both to 
minimize the fire danger and to assure the maintenance of proper architectural 
decorum. 
The next rejection stressed as negating elements the absence of the neces-
sary materials and the cost of required labor, beside adding, almost incidentally, 
disagreement with some of the structural features proposed for the cooking 
sheds. Now the yakuba played what I knew were its trump cards: the Japanese 
civilians in camp were quite amenable to a modified version of the cooking shed, 
they would donate their labor on Sundays to build them, and prior to that they 
would dismantle the buildings being abandoned by the US military elsewhere on 
the island and bring the salvaged lumber back to Susupe for the construction. 
Requested was the naval military government's permission to proceed. The result 
was capitulation, if I would be responsible for assuring that the yakuba would 
implement everything as proposed. Completely unmentioned in this exchange of 
communications was the spinoff impact this innovation would have in modifying 
the routine offood preparation followed in the camp. Now all that would be 
necessary was for me to obtain the concurrence of the Motor Pool for use of its 
vehicles on Sundays, requisition a supply of wrecking tools each weekend from 
the Public Works Section, and assure that the clerks of the suijiba were alerted 
to arrange for food to be prepared for a noonday meal when the internees would 
be away from camp, all this beside the yakuba assembling the necessary work 
crews. 
Early on the first appointed Sunday morning, I rendezvoused with a group 
of civilian drivers from the Motor Pool, and at the steering wheel of a borrowed 
jeep, led some dozen trucks to the camp gate. There a crowd of waiting men 
eagerly climbed aboard, tools in hand. Out we drove, my jeep at the head ofthe 
procession. Some of the civilians had not been far from camp since internment, 
and the festive air of being on a picnic soon engulfed the entire work crew. Our 
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destination was the former Station Hospital overlooking Magicienne Bay on the 
other side of the island, which for a while had cared for the civilians from Camp 
Susupe with serious medical conditions. Now all of the wooden buildings were 
abandoned. Once on the site, everyone seemed to derive a special pleasure from 
physically attacking the former wards. Indeed, some had to be reminded that the 
rationale for their being there was to return with salvageable lumber and only 
incidentally with broken pieces suitable for firewood. 
Loaded up, the procession triumphantly returned in the afternoon, horns 
blowing as the trucks reached camp. With the wood neatly piled and the fire-
wood distributed among the various dantai, the civilian workers dispers.ed,and I 
accompanied the trucks and their drivers back to the Motor Pool. My next thre.e 
Sundays were similarly fully occupied, thereby complying with the campruletbait 
Japanese civilians could not leave Susupe except when accompanied by a mem-
ber of the American armed forces. In retrospect, I shudder at the thought of what 
might have been the consequences for· me if any of those trucks bad been 
wrecked, or even if the borrowed tools whose requisition I had so cavalierly 
authorized had not been returned. Fortunately no untoward incident dispelled the 
euphoria that characterized this phase of the cooking-shed project. Even the 
weather seemed to smile on the endeavor. 
It was now up to the yakuba to carry on with the building of the cooking 
sheds. On weekends, civilians with carpentering skills, using tools borrowed from 
the Public Works Section, cut the salvaged lumber to predetermined lengths and 
assembled it. The schedule they followed somewhat resembled the factory line 
being used to construct the New Ku's long barracks buildings. Nails and other 
necessary materials were obtained from the Supply Department. The sheds were 
sited in the central court side of each barracks, separated from each other and the 
barracks in conformance with the plan submitted by the yakuba. Early in this 
phase, one cooking shed was hurried to completion as a model, so that it could 
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be inspected, and future sheds modified should it be found wanting. As to be 
expected, the construction phase proceeded slowly, lacking the picnic air of the 
lumber salvaging operation, but gradually a thin line of cooking sheds took shape 
inside the open court. One of the steps necessary before completion of each shed 
was filling the sand bed on its cooking shelf, a flat rectangular space wide and 
long enough for several persons to build cooking fires under the roof without risk 
of burning down the structure. This final step became a symbolic topping-off 
ceremony, and for it sand was obtained from the adjacent beach. 
On the weekends the cooking-shed project continued, and simultaneously 
work on the New Ku buildings proceeded during the week, with frames, siding, 
windows, and doors cut at the Public Works yard and assembled at the /cu. The 
intention was to have the sheds completed by the time the barracks were ready 
for occupancy. It seemed to take an inordinate amount oftime to conclude work 
on the New Ku,' and then for the naval military government to fix a date for 
civilians to be moved in. There was even talk of painting the outside walls of the 
new barracks, but eventually this extravagance was abandoned. Meanwhile the 
barracks buildings remained empty, and the cooking sheds, although now all 
completed, unused. 
Finally, with the war over, orders were received to mount the hegira and 
move approximately a thousand Japanese civilians over to the New Ku. Most 
were to come from a designated overcrowded dan. To the Registration Office 
fell the task of selecting the internees and specifying the rooms they were to 
occupy. A further delay ensued to accommodate those who for legitimate reasons 
wished to remain in the older portion of Area 3, or desired to change their 
assigned billeting. Finally, early on the appointed day, a long, continuous ribbon 
of men, women, and children slowly wound through camp over to the New Ku, 
carrying, dragging, or wheeling in handcarts all of their earthly possessions. For 
some the trip had to be repeated several times, so bulky were the personal 
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possessions they had amassed .during their period in camp. 
The internees took easily to the transfer, for one thing because they now 
enjoyed roomier, less crowded accommodations. A number eagerly set about 
reorganizing their living styles and cooking the food for their own meals in man-
ners more pleasing to their taste than was possible under the mass preparation 
and distribution methods of the camp's suijiba system. For them ,it was necessary 
to establish the equivalency of per person food allotments, a process facilitated by 
the routine I had earlier introduced into Area 3 of requiring the public reporting 
·of daily food deliveries to each suijiba. Rather than starting with raw ingredients, 
others received their food in cooked form each day and then reheated and supple-
mented it with foodstuffs purchased from the cooperative -trade .store. Instead of 
insisting on uniformity, the yakuba deliberately allowed such diversity t0at least 
partly counter the endemic complaints over camp food. 
The women who did not leave camp on labor details, but remained home 
during the day, provided another demonstration of the New Ku tenants settling 
into their new quarters. They organized into groups responsible for maintaining 
the cleanliness of the New Ku, and turned to with a fanatic commitment. Seem-
ingly, to each of them a single blade of grass in the large central court was.almost 
a personal affront, and they could be seen on hands and knees, under the hot 
Saipan sun, carefully scrutinizing the ground and plucking out any green shoot 
having the temerity to thrust itself into the light. The intent was commendable, 
but the consequences of the effort were sometimes nearly catastrophic. The New 
Ku had been built on silty ground, soil far finer than beach sand. Whenever the 
wind blew, it would stir up clouds of dust that would settle on the laundry hang-
ing out to dry and infiltrate all rooms not sealed by tightly closing their doors and 
shuttering their windows. Of course, so closed up, the heat of the day made 
staying indoors nearly unbearable. Try as I might to reason with the head of the 
ku that the women should not denude the central area-and, rather, plant a thick 
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species of temple grass native to Saipan-I found myself unable to sway anyone. 
These women had for too long been exposed to the norm that equated cleanliness 
with bareness, and apparently, bareness with beauty. 
The four wooden toilet buildings with their roofs towering prominently in 
the central court represented a triumph of applied ingenuity. To compensate for a 
total absence of toilet fixtures-Japanese or Western-available for use in Area 
3, a long, exaggerated bathtub-like trough was cdnstructed of cement on the 
ground. Above it, in the wooden floor that served as the ceiling of this catchment 
pit, the carpenters fashioned two parallel rows of ten holes, over which the 
internees could squat, the male and female sections separated from each other by 
a long plank wall. At one end of each toilet structure, two showers ran continu-
ously, with the water from them flowing into two iron drums, pivoted off-center. 
As the drums filled with water, the weight would cause them to tilt and empty 
their contents in a heavy splash into the pit below. Periodically this would flush 
all of the excrement in the pit out through the pipes laid on the ground to the 
septic tanks at the edge of the ku. Even these sewer pIpes embodied a nod to 
American ingenuity: lacking any allocation of metal or vitreous pipe to the Japa-
nese area, the engineer in charge of Public Works adapted his experience with the 
US Civilian Conservation Corps. After tarring one side of a number of long 
boards, he fashioned sets offour of them together into a box-pipe, tarred surfaces 
inside, joined these wooden "pipes" one to another, and laid the whole sewer-
not flat on the ground but on one of its diamond edges to speed the flow of the 
effluent to the septic tanks. Every thirty or so feet he had wooden sewer boxes 
built into the system, so that if necessary they could be used to clean out the 
sewer. 
The occupants of the New Ku soon became accustomed to climbing up the 
steps and using the elevated toilets. And the youngsters of the area soon discov-
ered that the toilets could be adapted for a game wholly unforeseen by their 
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builders. The children would drop their wooden geta (shoes) into the holes of the 
toilet and wait until the water from the suspended tank flushed them out of the 
pit. Riding the wave of water like little boats, the geta would then move through 
the sewers, to be retrieved at the closest sewer box as they came floating by. It 
would have been an innocent enough way for the children to pass the time but for 
the fact that the sewer system had a very low gradient, due to the lay of the land~ 
The-get a would occasionally clog the wooden pipes, which would then have to 
be cleaned out-· a very noxious and distasteful duty. 
The action of Americans in directing the carpenters to efect the privacy wall 
in the toilets· and separate the sexes was fully consonant with the general attitude 
of many of Susupe'smilitary government administrators. They viewed the mor.es 
of the Japanese, especially those in camp, as inferior to American. Not until years 
later, when I lived for a period in Japan and was introduced to both the practic.e 
of communal bathing and unisex toilet facilities, did I come to appreciate how 
foreign to the Japanese internees the separation of the sexes in the new toilet 
structures must have seemed. Nevertheless, not much more than a month after 
the move to the New Ku, theyakuba was waited on by a delegation of women. 
Indignantly they demanded that camp carpenters cover every knothole in the 
partition separating the male and female sections in each of the toilets. "Little 
boys" in the men's side were using the holes to spy on the women as they used 
the facilities! These complaints demonstrated how malleable some Japanese 
mores could be, and how quickly attitudes might be adapted in situations where 
American mores dominated. Was this a portent of what could be expected in the 
home islands of Japan under the MacArthur regime? 
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The adventitious combination of a covetous American navy commander being 
stationed on Saipan and an unknown number of Japanese starving to death on a 
barren island a week's sailing time away provides the setting for my last assign-
ment with the naval military government unit headquartered at Camp Susupe. 
The Gilbert and Sullivan element that weaves its way through this half-century 
old memory serves to cloak the serious potential at that time inherent in the 
acceptance of the surrender of Minami Tori Jima (literally, South Bird Island). 
A glance at a chart of the North Pacific discloses that the Northern Marianas 
are the geological continuation of a long stretch of archipelagos running south-
ward from Japan, frequently with many miles of open ocean separating them. 
Apart from this sweep of islands, and nearly a thousand miles to the northeast of 
Saipan, is a solitary island on the Tropic of Cancer. Marcus-for that is its 
English name-is a flat, barren speck of an island with an area not much larger 
than the long, crisscross runways of the military airfield the Japanese had con-
structed there. Reconnaissance photographs showed that these enemy installa-
tions had been decimated by American air strikes, and occasional naval bom-
bardment beginning in 1944. Huge craters pocked the runways and made them 
totally unusable. As new B-29 crews arrived in the Marianas, routinely their 
baptismal bomb run would be to Marcus before they began participating in the 
saturation raids over Japan. By the end of the war, the island had for long been so 
completely isolated that not even submarines were able to bring in emergency 
food supplies. General MacArthur's headquarters in Japan sent word to Saipan 
that the starving personnel on Marcus were in dire need of relief The intelligence 
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estimates available on Saipan indicated that they could include Japanese and 
Korean laborers caught there by the war. At this point the naval military govern-
ment entered the story, as did Saipan's commodore. 
The rank of commodore, long retired by the US Navy, was briefly reinstated 
for World War II. A vague reputation of having passed his prime characterized 
the navy commodore assigned to duty on Saipan. I had occasionally seen him 
"barrelling" around the island in a "souped up" jeep, garishly decorated with 
extra chrome fittings. The intelligence estimates indicated that Marcus was under 
the command ofa Japanese admiral, and the commodore was determined not 
only to participate in its surrender, but personally to receive the admiral's 'Sword. 
About this time nonbombing flights to Japan were becoming commonplace, and it 
was decided to expand the scope of the relief operation by rehabilitating the air-
field on Marcus to permit its use in emergencies by American planes off route to 
and from Japan. A destroyer escort that was in Saipanese waters would be sent 
to Marcus for the surrender, and it would be augmented by a marine detachment 
as added protection. An Air Corps "Acorn Unit" would follow in slower landiqg 
craft loaded with earthmoving equipment to restore the airfield. The commanders 
ofSusupe's Japanese and Korean areas would receive orders to travel aboard the 
destroyer escort to attend to the civilians reportedly on Marcus. In addition, my 
duties would include interpreting as necessary. 
Established communications between Saipan and Marcus did not exist. Pre-
sumably the MacArthur Headquarters would inform the Japanese military author-
ities in Tokyo that Saipan was dispatching the small flotilla, but it was unknown 
to Saipan how those marooned on Marcus would respond. To Camp Susupe's 
interpreters fell the collective assignment of crafting an ultimatum directing the 
Japanese on the island to signal that they were surrendering and were awaiting 
the arrival of the American ships. We understood full well the substance of the 
message to be communicated, but the choice of Japanese words to be used and 
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the style adopted seemed crucial. To assure the message we formulated was 
appropriately phrased, we enlisted the cooperation of the civilian in Area 3 who 
was the reporter for the Marianas Hiho and in whom we all had confidence. The 
final product directed that two white panels be laid crosswise on a designated 
Marcus runway to signify receipt of the communication and full intention to 
comply with its terms. Next, Saipan despatched a plane to drop the message on 
Marcus. The commodore was too impatient to wait on Saipan until a reply was 
received, and the destroyer escort set sail. 
Each day as we drew closer to Marcus a plane flew up from Saipan to 
visually check the airfield, and each day as it returned overhead it radioed to us 
the absence of any response. We reduced speed, and with only one day left 
before we would be in sight of Marcus, the returning plane finally confirmed that 
the crossed panels had been laid on the ground. The low, treeless outlines of 
Marcus appeared on the horizon the following day, and as it drew closer we 
could not distinguish a single standing structure. The destroyer escort dropped 
anchor in the lee of the island, on the side where a small passage had been blasted 
through the fringing reefleading to a narrow landing slip on the beach. Just the 
day before we had received a delayed message relayed from Saipan that General 
MacArthur's headquarters had granted permission for a Japanese coastal 
destroyer to bring food to Marcus. Barely had we anchored, put a ladder over the 
side, and secured a motor whaleboat to it, when the rust-streaked Japanese 
destroyer showed around the flank of the island, steaming very slowly toward us. 
The skipper of the destroyer escort attempted to establish communications with 
it, initially by radio and then by blinker and flag, without success. 
I then assumed my first and only command of an American naval vessel. 
"Meller," the destroyer escort skipper ordered, "take the ship's boat and tell the 
captain of that Japanese destroyer to stop and come over here." Down the ladder 
I went, jumped into the motor whaleboat, and told the coxswain at the tiller to 
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steer for the Japanese ship. As we approached it over a choppy sea, while it 
slowed to bare steerage way, I struck a heroic stance. in the bow of the whale-
boat, struggling to retain my balance with my hand raised like a policeman 
stopping traffic. HTomate/" (Stop!) I shouted as we drew closer, and the heads 
of severalJ apanese crewmen could be seen looking down. on us from the rail. I 
yelled thattheir captain should come aboard the American destroyer, and saw the 
heads bunch. as if conferring. Another head joined them; this one,wearing an 
officer's cap, and I repeated my message. Then all the heads disappeared, and. 
whether or not my message was understood I could not know; Meanwhile the 
Japanese ship continued slowly on, and then with a loud clanking, of chain and in· 
a cloud;.ofrust~ it dropped anchor. I decided to return to the destroyer and se.e 
whether the Japanese captain would appear. 
After a short wait, a small boat put out from the Japanese destroyer, carrying 
its captain and a young enlisted man. As the latter climbed up our ship's ladder 
behind his captain, I noticed that squeezed tightly under: his arm and' close to his 
chest hehelda.black-jacketed copy ofKenkyusha's bulky Japanese-English 
dictionary. The same publication had been issued to me in my first days at the 
navy language school years before, along with many others, and I had broughtit 
with me in case of need. I could not but look on the Japanese youngster asa 
somewhat kindred spirit. 
It developed that the Japanese captain had a freighter on the Japan-Seattle 
run before the war. For Marcus he was carrying a cargo of mostly dry food, and 
corrugated iron sheets for use as roofing. Conversation proceeded amicably over 
coffee in the wardroom, with the several enlisted men from US Army Intelligence 
aboard for the Marcus surrender negotiations carrying the burden of the inter-
preting. As best I can recall, no question was raised about the Japanese captain's 
wartime service, nor did he volunteer anything about it. 
The following day a Japanese landing barge carrying a two-man delegation 
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representing the Island High Command put out from Marcus and drew alongside. 
The officer in charge was a Japanese army colonel who was second in command 
on Marcus, a diminutive man with a strutting gait, short-cropped hair, a small 
bristling mustache, and as bristly a manner of speech. In sharp contrast with the 
amiability .ofthe previous day, formality distinguished this encounter. After the 
two Japanese were ushered into the wardroom and seated at one end of the table, 
as if on cue they reached into the briefcases they carried and each brought out a 
round, paper-wrapped package. Immediately the marine guards on the alert at the 
other end of the wardroom shouted a warning and drew their revolvers. Bombs! 
For a tense moment time froze. 
A hurried explanation disclosed that there was a melon in each of the pack-
ages, and the guns were returned to their holsters. A small, white-skinned melon 
was the only edible crop that would grow on Marcus, and the few fruit the vines 
did produce were reserved exclusively for the officers. They were bringing 
omiyage (gifts). Years later, when I lived in Japan, I came to appreciate the 
significant role of the omiyage in social intercourse and the particular appropri-
ateness of the melon in fulfilling this function. But the monetary expense of the 
melons in Japan, hardly equaled in personal cost the offering of such an omiyage 
on Marcus, where people were dying for want of food. 
Once matters were sorted out, the gifts presented and accepted, the parties 
settled down to the immediate business at hand. All portable Japanese weapons 
on Marcus would be collected and surrendered to the American forces, all 
ammunition secured, all mined areas on the island defused. Everything on Marcus 
would be open for inspection. When the US Navy landing craft arrived, full 
cooperation would be extended to the Air Corps Acorn Unit in rehabilitating the 
airstrips, and later in their use for emergency landings by American planes. 
Formal surrender of Marcus would take place on board the destroyer escort at a 
time to be set by the Americans, and the admiral would participate. As the 
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meeting drew to a close, the destroyer's skipper ordered the supply offoodstuffs, 
which had already been assembled, and to which at the last moment had been 
added perishables from the ship's reefers, to be loaded onto the Japanese barge 
for the delegation to take back. Down the ship's ladder the Japanese officers 
climbed, with the understanding that an American party would come ,ashore ,as 
soon as the mines protecting the landing beach reefs were deactivated. 
When I did walk around on Marcus, it became evident that the aerial photo-
graphs recording the devastation of the island failed to reveal the massive laby-
rinth of deep, dank, underground bunkers, connected bya network of passage-
ways, that now housed its garrison. Seemingly they were little touched by the 
surface destruction, other than the few whose ceiling,s were now open to the sky. 
Large caliber, English-manufactured guns, which along with their platforms had 
been transferred to Marcus from Singapore after it fell to the Japanese, still 
remained fully operational guarding the outer defenses of the island. It was 
apparent to me that they could easily have blown our destroyer escort out of the 
water if we had originally stood in close to the island before the crossed white 
panels were laid out on the Japanese airstrip as signals of capitulation, as 
reportedly our commodore impatiently favored as we sailed to Marcus. 
That first trip onto the island also confirmed what I had suspected: there were 
only Japanese military personnel on Marcus and no civilians, either Korean or 
Japanese. For my colleague from Camp Susupe who was commander of the 
Korean area, Navy Lieutenant Jack Taylor, the assignment to Marcus became a 
total waste of time, and he soon obtained orders to return to Saipan. But when I 
sought similar permission, I found that my Japanese-language skills were to keep 
me on Marcus for a while longer. 
Japanese army barges had now begun ferrying runs between the Japanese 
destroyer and the island, piled high with straw-sacked rice. A platoon of Japanese 
military was drawn up in single file at the landing area, waiting to transport the 
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unloaded rice to a storage area. As I watched, a sack slipped from the grasp of a 
sailor and fell, its contents spilling out over the ground. To men long on starva-
tion rations, the shock of seeing this was too great to bear, and the platoon broke 
ranks, the men rushing in to scoop up the rice with their hands. The Japanese 
lieutenant in charge sharply called them back, loudly reprimanding them. As soon 
as they were again lined up, now at attention, he proceeded to stride down the 
front of the platoon, harshly slapping each man across the face as he passed by. I 
doubt that this was intended to impress the watching Americans, but was rather 
an automatic reflex application of appropriate Japanese military discipline. 
For the brief surrender ceremonies that occurred aboard the destroyer escort, 
I had no interpreting duties, as this responsibility fell to the two men from army 
intelligence aboard for that purpose. Prominently displayed on the table at which 
the Japanese officers signed the surrender documents was the admiral's sword. 
All officers on Marcus were likewise ordered to surrender their swords, which 
several days later they did, each in a slim wooden box bearing on its cover in 
kanji (Japanese characters) the rank and name of its owner. By the terms of the 
surrender, all binoculars, telescopes, artillery sighting devices, and comparable 
other detachable military equipment were similarly to be delivered. When 
received, the swords were housed in a separate tent, but the detachable equip-
ment was just piled up on the ground, and there it remained, open to the 
elements, for the entire period I was on the island. 
About the time the Japanese coastal destroyer completed transferring its 
cargo to shore, weighed anchor, and departed for Japan, the large American 
landing craft dispatched from Saipan showed up. With consummate skill their 
skippers maneuvered their ships in line into the island's narrow harbor channel 
and to the landing slip on shore. One by one they opened their clamshell bows, 
their cargo of loaded trucks and earthmoving equipment was driven right off and 
onto land, and the landing craft reversed engines and backed out. The marine 
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The surrender aboard ship on Marcus. The Japanese anny officer seated to the left is the 
colonel, second in command on the island. In the middle is the admiral, whose sword is in the 
box an the table. At right is the naval commander about whom the story of the robe is told. 
(USArmy) 
contingent also set to work immediately, erecting tents on the end of one landing 
strip-enough to accommodate all the Americans ashore including themselves, 
the Air Corps Acorn Unit, and the miscellany of persons like me temporarily 
assigned to duty on Marcus. The several rows of tents were supplemented by a 
galley to feed everyone, auxiliary power generators, desalination equipment, and 
sanitation facilities, a self-sufficient encampment. I looked forward to the pros-
pect of again being able to sleep at night on a stable bed, but the events of the 
next few days were to allow me little uninterrupted opportunity for that. 
No sooner had we settled into our tents than one of the Air Corps officers 
reported to the Acorn Unit commander that he had stumbled onto a plot among 
the Japanese on Marcus to drive the Americans into the sea. While poking 
around the Japanese bunkers he had struck up a conversation with a Japanese 
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Meller in front of a Japanese tank on Marcus, with tents in background. 
(Courtesy of Norman Meller) 
noncommissioned officer who prior to the war had attended the University of 
California at Los Angeles. The Air Corps officer was a faculty member at that 
university, and so he had been told this confidential information. The lieutenant 
colonel in charge of the marine detachment was immediately alerted. The next 
thing I knew, about a dozen Japanese light tanks were clanking around the tents, 
positioned to encircle the encampment. I was then reassured to see US Marines 
climbing out of the tanks. They had found them in protected revetments and had 
commandeered all of those still operational. How the marines were able to 
squeeze into the minuscule interiors of the tanks to steer them was difficult to 
fathom. Nor did I know whether the tanks' machine guns were still operational, 
so they could be turned against the Japanese to repel an attack. Nevertheless, the 
mere interpositioning of their iron sides around the tents, like wagons encircling 
an encampment of western pioneers, lent a false sense of security. A twenty-four-
hour armed guard was posted, and only when the scare abated, was it reduced to 
the night hours. 
There was little need for interaction between the Japanese and Americans 
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once the latter were on the island and repair of the airfield was under way, but a 
degree of fraternization inevitably occurred as the Japanese solicited American 
cigarettes and men from both sides sought to trade. Any Japanese personnel 
approaching the encampment at night would be immediately challenged by the 
marine guards. Since there might be a reasonable explanation for the Japanese 
presence, I would be called on to interpret. Fairly quickly, it was established that 
any Japanese wishing to establish contact would use the password "Meruru" (my 
name in kala kana, one of the J apanese syllabaries), and I would be caned by the 
marine guard. For the next few nights I rested only fitfully, for it seemed that I 
would just fall asleep before again being awakened. Duringthe day I would 
similarly be asked to interpret when transcultural difficulties engendered 
misunderstandings. 
The size and capacity of the earthmoving equipment brought in by the Air 
Corps Acorn Unit amazed the Japanese. After locating beds of what it called 
"live" coral, that is, strata of coral sufficiently soft to be surface"mined, the .unit' s 
behemoths would rumble down into these pits, fill up their gargantuan bellies 
with scooped-up coral, and then waddle out and over to the bombed-out strips, 
there to dump their loads in the holes, and return to repeat the process. Large 
bulldozers brought from Saipan would level the piled-up coral, and after it had 
been watered down, giant rollers would compact it. Just as the Japanese civilians 
were fascinated by the army's road-building film one evening months earlier in 
Camp Susupe, so the Japanese military personnel on Marcus watched open-
mouthed at the sight of this modern American equipment in action. 
One afternoon while in my tent I heard a low, muffled explosion. Word 
quickly spread that a bulldozer had hit an unexploded bomb, which had badly 
injured its driver as well as wrecked the dozer. I thought relatively little ofit at 
the moment, but soon I was called on by the Japanese army colonel, the Marcus 
Island second in command. He had come to explain that they were entirely 
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unaware a bomb was there. The explosion was not due to a mine they had failed 
to defuse; the detonation was entirely accidental. Would I please so inform the 
Acorn Unit's commander? It was obvious he was worried, even scared, that 
some serious punishment would be ordered by the Americans. I communicated 
the verbal message and his expression of regret to the commander. After an 
informal inquiry, the matter was dropped as due to hitting an unexploded aerial 
bomb. However, I could only wonder what the reaction would have been if the 
parties had been reversed, with a Japanese military officer in command. 
Life on Marcus for the American personnel was not a pleasant picnic. For one 
thing, during the day there was little shade. In the evening, to break the monot-
ony the Acorn Unit commenced showing American movies it had brought with it. 
The Japanese admiral was invited to attend, and Japanese personnel crowded in 
on both sides of the assembled Americans. My seat was between the Acorn Unit 
commander and the Japanese admiral, for whom I would attempt to supply a 
running commentary in Japanese, acquainting him with the gist of what was 
transpiring on the screen. All appeared to go well, as far as I was concerned, and 
he seemed to enjoy the shows. Then the admiral offered to reciprocate by having 
his personnel project Japanese films that were on the island: Of course they were 
solely in the Japanese language, without English subtitles, and none of them were 
old Japanese chestnuts like the Forty-seven Ronin, with whose plots I was long 
familiar. So I found myself desperately trying to explain to the Acorn Unit's com-
mander, sitting on one side of me, what was happening in some modem Japanese 
movie replete with colloquialisms, while the admiral on the other side of me, 
sotto voce, was volunteering comments. I shudder to think of how relationships 
between the actors in the films were misconstrued and nuances misinterpreted. 
Fortunately for me, the American personnel much preferred English-language 
films, so few Japanese movies were projected. 
During this period, I also experienced a new perspective on the relative status 
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of enemies once hostilities are over. The lieutenant colonel in charge of the US 
Marine detachment while in service before the war had been in Singapore at the 
same time as a Japanese navy commander on the admiral's staff. Whether they 
were personally acquainted there was never clear to me. As an act of military 
courtesy the commander invited the colonel to join him for dinner at his ,quarters, 
and, under the excuse of requiring an interpreter, the coloneLasked that lbe 
permitted to accompany him. Actually the Japanese naval officer's command -of 
English was adequate enough for such an occasion, so my presence ,may have 
been really intended to raise the colonel's status by having staff accompany him. 
An orderly of the Japanese commander prepared the dinner,and],couldnot help 
·but wonder if the ingredients in the sukiyaki were not part of the ,massive food 
package the destroyer escort had contributed. I found the food tasty, and warm 
saki (rice wine) added to the enjoyment. During the dinner ,the Japanese com-
mander wore a blue silk lounging robe, which he said he ,had obtained inSinga-
pore. The colonel expressed admiration of the robe,. and pointedlyr.emarked ,that 
he regretted his missed opportunity to acquire a similar one. The following day, 
the commander's orderly called at my tent with a carefully wrapped ;giftfor -the 
colonel. It was the silk lounging robe. 
The requests for the services of"Meruru" markedly decreased, and soon 
there was little for me to do by way of interpreting. Work ontheairstl'ips was 
proceeding routinely. With food once again available, health conditions on 
Marcus had noticeably improved, and no longer did small boats quietly put out in 
the early morning through the reef to bury at sea their once-human cargo. Then 
abruptly the calm was broken. Up to my tent stormed the Japanese army colonel, 
the island's second-in-command. Obviously angry, he drew himself up to.full 
height, pushed his bristly mustache within a few inches of my chin, and while 
waving a piece of paper in his left hand, poked me on the chest with the index 
finger of his right hand to emphasize his words. "Give back our swords," he 
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shouted. That I was taken aback is an understatement, for I did not have the least 
idea of why he was objecting now to the Japanese officers having surrendered 
their swords. Given his size, I did not feel physically intimidated. The thought 
very briefly crossed my mind of whether I as an American navy officer should 
allow a Japanese officer, by so acting, to demean the authority of the United 
States. 
I immediately ordered the colonel never to yell at me or rap me like that 
again. His response was to thrust at me the paper he was carrying and simulta-
neously shout that General MacArthur in Tokyo had ordered that all Japanese 
military being repatriated from the South Pacific be allowed to return with their 
household effects. That, declared the colonel, meant the officers on Marcus had 
been tricked and should have their swords back. 
My reply was that if, indeed, the MacArthur Headquarters had issued the 
order, the Americans on Marcus had not been informed of it. We did not have 
radio contact with Tokyo as apparently he had. In addition, it seemed to me the 
message was obviously being misconstrued by the Japanese on Marcus to include 
swords in the phrase "household effects." At the time I did not realize that in 
giving meaning to the contents of the MacArthur order I was responding to my 
full role as an interpreter. I concluded with the statement that I would bring the 
matter to the attention of the Air Corps Acorn Unit commander, but that nothing 
could change until communication was established with the MacArthur Head-
quarters. The colonel left in an ugly mood, and I immediately informed the Air 
Corps commander of what had happened. Quickly the marine detachment was 
alerted to post a twenty-four-hour armed guard around the American encamp-
ment. My tent adjoined the one containing the boxed swords, and I do not 
remember sleeping soundly. Relations between the Japanese and the Americans 
on Marcus remained tense until a message was received from the MacArthur 
Headquarters, via Saipan, that swords were not intended to be included in 
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"household effects." 
With the crisis of the Japanese swords resolved, at least to the extent of 
clarifying the meaning of the MacArthur order, and there being little to keep me 
busy on Marcus, I was anxious to return to Saipan. As I computed, what'with 
being married and having served overseas, by this time I had accumulated about 
enough "points" to be entitled to be sent back to the United States and ,demobil-
ized.But the release from service would have to be arranged 'by individum Jetter 
sent to the chief of naval personnel through the chain of command,'starting:,with 
the'naval military government at Camp Susupe. Once againlrequest-etl.ip;ermis-
sion to leave Marcus, and now received orders to embark on ,one o:f.the landing 
craft from Saipan standing off the island. As I boarded it, I was met 'by a crew 
member inquiring if I had any dirty laundry. My clothes inthe-ship's washing 
machines 'and my body in a hot shower received their fir-stscrubbingin'weeks. 
Whathappened next was almost an anticlimax to theMarcusa~signmen.t, and 
my years of duty in the Pacific. I declined the offer ofajurnpin rankiflwould 
stay onSaipan until the Japanese civilians were repatriated. The flow of daily Ufe 
in CampSusupecontinued while I waited for what seemed an interminably lung 
period for my orders to return to the United States. When finally received, they 
directed that I sail the following day, and I hurriedly bid farewell to Mayor Shoji 
and Judge Yanigata. The navy transport was supposed to land at San Diego,but 
so many vessels loaded with returning military personnel were then heading to 
the west coast of the United States that San Diego could not process them all. 
San Pedro was our next designated destination, and for the same reason we 
continued to be rerouted toward ports further north until finally we landed at 
Seattle. After years in the balmy Pacific and with only light shirts and shorts to 
wear, I found myself walking down an uncovered gangplank shivering in a 
snowstorm. Despite this chilly reception, it was more than offset by the warming 
realization of being back home. 
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* * * 
Postscript: Long after I was discharged from the Navy and months after Camp 
Susupe's Japanese civilians were repatriated, a letter was forwarded to me from 
Mayor Shoji thanking me for the many courtesies I had extended to him while I 
was commander of Area 3. Elderly Judge Yanagita had died shortly after they 
had reached Japan. Conditions in Japan were very difficult, especially for those 
returning from overseas. He closed with a request that I convey his respects to 
my wife. Knowing how severe living arrangements had been on Saipan, but that 
he had never asked for special consideration for himself, despite this letter being 
written in Japanese it required no translation to read between the lines. My 
immediate response was to send a CARE food package. Years later, while living 
in Japan, my wife and I invited his widow to meet with us at our hotel for dinner. 
She proved to be as straight-backed physically, and in manners dignified, as her 
husband. Possibly as a fit measure of my Japanese language skills as recounted to 
her by her husband, she appeared with an English-speaking Catholic priest to 
interpret. 
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banzai 
benjo 
campo 
cha wan mushi 
dantai 
dantaicho 
furoshiki 
gaijin 
geta 
han 
hancho 
kanji 
katsubushi 
ku 
kucho 
maguro sashimi 
manju 
miso 
misoshiyo 
muro 
naichijin 
nisei 
omiyage 
Glossary 
a cheer or war cry; an all-out, desperate attack 
latrine 
the air and sea bombardment that begail four days 
beforeD day 
a type of custard 
administrative section or subdistrict 
section chief or administrative head 
square Japanese cloth 
foreigner 
thonged slippers, like zori 
the group occupying a barracks 
leader of a han 
Chinese characters used in Japanese 
boiled, fire-dried bonito fillets 
wards 
head of a ward 
tuna fish sashimi 
Japanese-style cookies of flour dough filled with sweetened 
beans 
a fermented rice paste 
a soup made from miso, with shavings of katsubushi added 
baby mackerel 
person from the Japanese home islands 
second-generation immigrants 
gifts 
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sashimi 
sense;. 
shibai 
shikr'sha 
shiogara! 
suijiUa 
suijicho' 
suimono' 
sukiyaki; 
sumo' 
tenpura' 
yakuUa 
raw fish dipped in soy sauce 
honored person; teacher 
facade, playacting 
barracks 
salted fish entrails 
cookhouse,. kitchen 
chief cook 
salt-cured pickled vegetables 
meat and vegetable stew 
a,Japanese form of wrestling 
food, such as raw vegetables or shrimp; dipped~ih egg' 
hatter and cooked in hot oil 
internal Japanese civilian administration'and1its offices 
ii'rArea 3 
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